


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JPRS Report



Soviet Union

Military Affairs



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'Dedovshchina': Investigation of Complaint to Yazov

18010242 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Oct 88 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lt Gen Avn V. Mikhaylov, first deputy chief of the political directorate of PVO Troops and Col A. Yurkin, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Hiding Behind 'Dedovshchina.' What a Checkup on One of the Letters Received by the USSR Ministry of Defense Showed"]

[Text] "My nephew, Andrey Vasilievich Khaborskiy, has been serving since December 1987....," writes Raisa Nikitichna Minyayeva, the wife of an officer, from Lvovskaya Oblast. "Recently he wrote letters to friends to the effect that he was being beaten up, and that demands for money and a watch were made of him. His mother, Anna Nikitichna Khaborskaya, is in the hospital as a result. My husband, Capt Nikolay Nikolayevich Minyayev, departed on the 27th to see him. On the evening of the 27th I received a letter from Andrey in which he asks that I send him 650 rubles, and if I do not, he will take his life or will run away from there, and that I should in no case come to him. I there and then sent 650 rubles in Andrey's name.

"I earnestly ask that you look into this and that you transfer my nephew Andrey Vasilievich Khaborskiy out of that unit, because revenge can be taken on him for my complaint. 29 September 1988."

When we were flying to the remote garrison where Pvt Andrey Khaborskiy serves, we were troubled by thoughts of "dedovshchina" [a practice where more senior soldiers exploit recruits for personal gain or convenience]. So much has been said and written about this, and then still another variety of this ugly phenomenon protrudes from a corner of army life. The "dedy," [perpetrators of dedovshchina, literally "old fogeys"] it appears, began to demand money and valuable watches. And the thought occurred: did a notorious racket get into our barracks? We did not want to believe this, but the letter of the officer's wife, who knew military life quite well, indicated that some kind of new form of perversion of mutual relations has shown up in the soldiers' environment.

And so we are talking with Andrey Khaborskiy in the electronics unit. Of average height, narrow-faced and far from an athletic build, he very calmly talked about himself. He completed 10-year school in Nesterov, and afterwards he studied in the Lvov SPTU No 29 [vocational training school] to be an electric welder. He took an interest in sports and music, and he read a lot.

"I like the stories of Pushkin, and I knew a lot by heart from "Yevgeniy Onegin,"" says Andrey, and there and then he gets specific: "In school, I knew. . ."

We listen, not interrupting with questions, and we wait until the soldier talks about his offenders. For he knows that we came to defend him, but he keeps quiet about the

main thing. . . Is he really so frightened that he does not intend to open up. We had to be specific: when, who and for what reason did that person beat him up and demand money and a watch?

"They did not even touch me," declares Khaborskiy. "And I did not write home that I was being treated badly. . ."

It seems that the wife of Captain Minyayev was exaggerating? But for what reason? So that the nephew would be transferred to serve in another place? What is so bad here, when the military post is one of the best in the district, with a good enlisted mess and barracks and a heavily populated city close by with interesting historical monuments and architecture. Speaking of the service, until recently Private Khaborskiy performed the duties of a staff clerk, and, clearly, he did not experience any burdens. That may be so, but Raisa Nikitichna would not have sent the nephew a money order, the receipt for which she left with the judge advocate's office, should something happen to him. . .

"They actually demanded money from me," admits Khaborskiy. "And a watch also."

Does this mean that Minyayeva was right to complain to the USSR Ministry of Defense? We will not try to confirm this, because fellow-servicemen were demanding their own money from Khaborskiy. They are completing their service, and an order arrives to remove them from the unit rolls, but how can you go home if a debtor is not taking appropriate action [yesli dolzhnik i usom ne vedet]. He answers: wait, he says, you will get everything that was promised.

Khaborskiy promised a lot—cross country running shoes, winter jackets [kurtki-alyaski] and high boots. . . To purchase these items, he took 200 rubles from one person and 300 rubles from another person. In his own words, he took these substantial sums in this way from the pockets of soldiers and sent them to Igor Pika, a friend in his hometown. He also engaged in "commercial" deals previously, but a misfire occurred here: either his pal did not want to part with the large sum, or he ran into some trouble, but he did not send any winter jackets [alyaski] or warm boots, and the companions began to be pressed for time. Those who put up money, understanding that an attempt was being made to swindle them, promised to complain to the political department. It was then that Khaborskiy began to call for help.

As indicated in the letter, Captain Minyayev was the first to rush to his aid. He arrived at the post in civilian clothes and began to shame the officers of the unit for their inability to work with subordinates.

"We will not get excited," Capt N. Toichkin assuaged the guest. "Let us look into this calmly."

It turned out that learning the particulars was not that simple. The officers had to ask the chief of the guard-house for a meeting with the arrested Private Khaborskiy. He, while Minyayev was getting to the garrison, was having fun on a city leave and was arrested in a state of alcoholic intoxication by a patrol detail. This was the second incident of alcoholic use by the soldier who seemingly had an interest at one time in Pushkin's poetry.

"Captain Minyayev understood what the problem was," says Toichkin, who remained as commander of the subunit. "After a conversation with Khaborskiy, he departed, not even excusing himself for his tactlessness."

The captain disappeared, but his wife appeared on the horizon. She attacked the commander and other officers of the unit, convinced that a threat was hanging over her nephew. After seeing him safe and sound, Raisa Nikitichna did not stop being indignant at procedures in the subunit until she saw the watch on Khaborskiy's wrist. She was convinced that the "dedy" [more senior soldiers who abused recruits] had taken it away from him a long time ago. And she was completely taken aback when she learned about the "commercial" activity of her young relative.

"How can I look people in the eyes now?" she moaned.

However, Raisa Nikitichna was not grieved for long. She announced that she would get the money out of Andrey's pal, and for this reason she took back the money order receipts. She did not get around to sending a telegram or calling those offices where she had just made assertions about beatings and extortion in the unit. It appears that she was more excited over the financial costs than over the moral well-being of her relative and the unpleasant situation that had developed essentially because of the Minyayev's. Here the attempt to use "dedovshchina" as a cover appears naive. In the situation that had set in, it would have been simpler to send a telegram to the commander and ask to talk with him. But no, they leaped before they looked [bukhnut v kolokola, nye zaglyanuv v svyatsy].

Of course, any person has a right to turn to any authority. One can only welcome civic boldness and combative qualities in a situation where a just cause is being championed. But for some it is advantageous to conceal a lie in a capsule of truth and to deceive people. Andrey Khaborskiy learned how to engage in petty profiteering of this very kind long before his service, but he wanted to perfect himself during his service on a larger scale. That same Pika always brought items to him.

The question naturally arises: why was the "commercial" activity of the soldier not stopped at the very beginning? Perhaps this should be talked about in particular by turning to the history of the phenomenon. Items for resale [pereprodavaly] first appeared in units when the music of various ultramodern ensembles

started to blare. It was then that soldiers, whose friends and relatives had access to platters in short supply, started to sell records to their colleagues at exorbitant prices. Afterwards the boom died down noticeably. But then electronic watches became the vogue, and representatives of port cities in other locations, which foreigners visit frequently, became soldier gratifiers. The speculative wave in electronics has not yet calmed down. It is no accident that Khaborskiy represented himself to the radar operators as a young vendor and offered them the most popular goods, including watches. And there were orders.

Thus, little by little, as if inadvertently, petty and later major speculation penetrated the soldiers' environment in some places. Its strengthening occurred with the birth of cooperatives and with that discrepancy in prices in shops that differentiates the very same product in the Transcarpathia and Kazakhstan and in the Baltics and Turkmenia. The soldiers' market, which has two annual highpoints that coincide with periods of release into the reserves, in the opinion of independent merchants, is the safest and most unfailing and reliable market. Here no one stands on price, and they take without haggling, having more money than they can count. And there is a paradox here in our contemporary life. The essence of the matter is not that the soldier does not know how to spend. There is nothing surprising in this—he has too little experience in life. The problem lies elsewhere: why should a young person, provided with all of the necessities, have large sums of money? For example, Pvt Oleg Marenko was given 100 rubles by his grandfather, Nikolay Sergeyevich Vasiliyev, a major in the reserves, who came to visit him, and Oleg's mother sent him a postal money order for 160 rubles. Of this sum, Oleg gave 200 rubles to Khaborskiy for the purchase of articles, and he left 60 rubles for himself, as he says, for personal needs.

However, neither O. Makarenko nor Private V. Abrosimov and Junior Sergeant G. Dzhailov, whose money Khaborskiy tried to appropriate by cheating, are the biggest holders of money notes. Nina Ivanovna Yemelyanova, supervisor at the local post office, named more than 30 names of soldiers and sergeants of the unit who received money orders in sums of from 100 to 500 rubles. All told during the year, which is not yet over, postal workers handed out more than 300,000 rubles that came from parents! The local military store is not able to cover this huge sum with goods. Let us think about it, how can and should the soldier use this money? Are not these bounties provoking factors, and will they not actually give rise to an army version of a racket?

"Dedovshchina" has many faces, and it is necessary to fight it together. Everywhere. Otherwise questions to which there are no ready answers will arise again and again. For example, as with Khaborskiy's watch.

No one took Andrey's watch, and no one tried to do this. Impulsiveness befogged the eyes of Captain Minyayev and his wife and did not make it possible to get a clear

picture. The essence of the matter is this: Warrant Officer A. Tsapenko gave Khaborskiy 50 rubles for the purchase of an electronic watch for his wife's birthday. He knew that he was overpaying, but he reasoned in a narrow-minded way: there is no point, they say, in fussing over a trifle. . . But the soldier [Khaborskiy] had other views on this account—he took the money and he did not intend to give it back: the warrant officer will not complain to the commander about me, for he himself selected me for staff work and praised me. You see what kind of unexpected collisions take place when someone or all of us diffidently turn away and pretend that nothing in particular was occurring. Then we put the blame on "dedovshchina," using it as a shield to cover our flaws in educational work.

We came to this conclusion after thoroughly investigating a specific case, making no claims that there is one simple judgment, but taking full responsibility for impartiality during verification of the facts.

FROM THE AUTHORS. At our request, political officer Major O. Kudasov visited the mother of the soldier. She showed him her son's letter in which he informs her that he was "working very hard and my only hope is Aunt Raya. If she will help, then I will come to her on leave, and I will start a career. . . If she will not help, I will run away from here, or there will be something bad."

"I really did not want Andrey to be friends with this black marketeer Pika," said Khaborskaya. "My son reproached me that I do not know how to live and that there is no money, and Igor always has money—he will visit him. He took a drive to see my son twice."

The soldier's mother wrote a letter to the USSR Minister of Defense in which she asked that her kinswoman be forgiven for her rash haste. She expresses the hope that her son will serve honorably and conscientiously. We also hope so.

Defense Ministry Accused of Evading, Ignoring Readers' Questions

18010242 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian
No 44, 29 Oct-4 Nov 88 p 3

[Article by N. Soldatenkov: "Bureaucratic Games—88. Questions Without Answers"]

[Text] Each issue of "AiF" [Arguments and Facts] publishes answers to readers' questions. But, nonetheless, dissatisfied readers frequently call up and write, and they ask: "Why have there been no answers to the questions we raised?" Actually, why not? Do not the fundamental principles of glasnost, which were talked about in the resolution of the 19th party conference, apply to everyone: it is "the inalienable right of each citizen to receive full and reliable information on any question of public life that does not constitute a state and military secret: the

right to open and free discussion of any publicly significant question"? Unfortunately, apparently, not to all. Let us take a number of examples.

Today, as never before, interest in the life of the armed forces has grown. It must be said that not only military command authorities know about the problems of the SA [Soviet Army] and the VMF [Navy], but many citizens of our country as well, including employees of "AiF" who themselves recently wore the soldier's field overcoat. And we were frankly amazed by the answer of the chief political directorate of the SA and the VMF, signed by V. Yakimov, chief of the department of culture and art, to a question by S. Barsov, a reader from Kishinev.

The question sounded like this: "Many armies of the world, including the armies of socialist countries, have well-organized leisure time for the rank and file. How does this matter stand with us?" The answer begins with the phrase that "the organization of cultural leisure time for personnel of the VS [armed forces] of the USSR is a component part of the daily activity of commanders at all echelons."

"The armed forces of the USSR have splendid opportunities for spiritual growth. . ." Indeed, everything looks proper on paper. But in life? For example: "Army and navy libraries have more than 120 million books." Possibly, but as soldiers' letters addressed to "AiF" attest, there are disastrously few books in national languages, and there are none at all in some libraries.

"Of the total volume of transmissions by Central Television and Radio, the military and patriotic theme constitutes about 600 hours a day." We will not now analyze telecasts and radio broadcasts, but expressions of the type "far-fetched," "out of touch with life" and so forth frequently appear in these same letters from servicemen with respect to some military and patriotic transmissions. At the same time, servicemen do not have the opportunity to watch others that raise the problems of youth, such as, "Vzglad" ["Opinion"], for example, because the telecast occurs after taps.

We learn from the answer that "on the average in a year's service, a serviceman has the opportunity to watch television for up to 500 hours, listen to the radio for 200 hours, read 15 to 20 books, and also to see about 100 feature films, 4 to 6 plays and visit 10 to 12 museums." But everyone who has served knows that, in principle, only those who serve in large cities enjoy such opportunities.

In addition, soldiers, as a rule, visit those performances that other viewers simply do not attend, and films are frequently old and of a low artistic level.

Thus, how can young people in 2 or 3 years of service not only become skilled in their military specialty but also at least maintain their cultural and intellectual level? And

is there really nothing in the area of a soldier's spare time that would require change and improvement? Alas, nothing is said about this in the answer.

The next question, we are confident, concerned and concerns every serviceman: "All citizens of the USSR have a right to an annual leave. Why are rank and file personnel and sergeants of the armed forces of the USSR deprived of this right?" (O. Vasiliyev, city of Perm.) The answer came from I. Matveyev, deputy chief of the Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "The rights and duties of compulsory service personnel are established by the USSR Law 'On Universal Military Service' and by regulations of the armed forces of the USSR. Taking into account the specific nature of the conditions and peculiarities of performing active compulsory military service, the need to maintain troops in constant combat readiness, for which every soldier must become proficient in a military specialty in a limited period of time and strengthen it in practice, soldiers and seamen and sergeants and master sergeants are granted leave by way of incentive, for reasons of illness and family situation and in connection with special service conditions. Annual leaves for this category are not granted. At the same time, legislation grants them enough opportunity for rest on the completion of service."

But what if, nonetheless, at least one leave was introduced for inducted servicemen, as is done in those socialist countries where the term of service is even shorter than ours? It seems that a meeting with relatives and friends would only be beneficial to soldiers, and for those who are serving outside the borders of our country, it would be a real holiday.

In exchange for it, it would be possible to shorten the time of rest after service, and the state would gain from this. Naturally, this right would not apply to malicious violators of military discipline, and it would not be a privilege for commanders' "favorites," as sometimes happens.

We think that the introduction of mandatory leaves on the whole will help also to change the attitude of young people toward the army and to improve discipline in the ranks. It can be objected: imagine, what a trifle—leaves and books. Can this, let us say, even affect discipline? It appears that it can. Because the service is not only so many parades and inspections. Perhaps ignoring these would seem to be a trivial detail and would result in the fact that, as was stated in a recent meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, "the task set by the CPSU Central Committee—to ensure a fundamental strengthening of discipline in the army and in the navy—is being resolved slowly. There are cases of evasion of military service, relations among servicemen that are at variance with regulations, and cases of violation of rules of alert duty and accidents with combat equipment." And what do the readers think about this?

There is one more organization that sent us an "answer,"—USSR Civil Defense Headquarters. "Why don't we have an open sale of dosimeters, gas masks and other means of personal protection?"—asks O. Pankratova from Moscow. Really, what for? We expressed our interest to the headquarters. And this is the answer we received: "Questions of sales of personal means of protection and dosimeter devices do not come under the authority of civil defense. The indicated items that are in civil defense supplies have a special purpose. Col Gen V. Kozhbakhteyev, chief of staff, USSR CD."

In fact, we did not expect that CD Headquarters would turn into a store for the sale of gas masks. But the question about personal means of protection and dosimeter instruments, and the possibility of their open acquisition by everyone desiring them, troubles many citizens of the country, especially in connection with the Chernobyl tragedy and also with cases of violations of the ecological situation in some cities and settlements which have become the property of glasnost.

If the Headquarters itself is not capable of answering this question, it is evidently necessary to address it to those responsible for this.

And lastly. The speech of V. Mironenko, the first secretary of the VLKSM central committee, at the all-union seminar "The USSR Armed Forces—for 70 Years on Guard of Peace and Socialism" was more interesting, bold and critical, and the editorial staff wanted to publish it, and in February of this year it sent it to the VLKSM central committee for coordination. Since that time, as they say, we have not heard a word.

We cited only several cases and named specific executors of bureaucratic pro forma answers. But, alas, there are considerably more such "answers," or our questions are simply disregarded. Today is a time of glasnost. And we will hope that sooner or later the wind of change will blow away the numerous bureaucratic fences behind which hide an inability or reluctance to work in a new way.

Nationalities Disturbances Create Problems In Naval Training

*18010125a Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Oct 88 p 5*

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank V. Bisultanov, Pacific Fleet: "The Nationality Aspect of the Military Collective—United by a Common Goal"]

[Text] Not long ago the Naval Political Directorate sent naval units reference materials that contained summarized information about the historic and national features of some of the union republics and the ethnic features, traditions and daily customs of the people that had settled them. If you consider that at the present time our crew's quarters are filled with representatives from "all of those republics," it is not difficult to guess that

there were many places in which this information was met with a lot of attention and interest. One of the most important aspects was that there were none of the bombastic cliches that set people's teeth on edge, the very cliches that had previously filled such commemorative booklets.

Our attitude toward the problem of an international upbringing for soldiers is changing practically before our eyes at the present time. There are much fewer bombastic phrases on this subject. There are more and more sober, realistic evaluations, and commanders and political workers are putting more pressing interest into the fact that international attitudes, how they take shape and how they are manifested, are a reality in military collectives.

This is quite a lot. I remember how some officers underwent a kind of shock after the well-known nationalistic displays in Alma-Ata in December 1986. They said that it was as if the sacred objects with which they had educated people for many years were tumbling to the ground. What could they take to the sailors to use to prepare for the unexpected?

Now there is something to use as comparison. In particular, the events around Nagorniy Karabakh and the peculiarities of the situation in the Baltic which are naturally raising a number of interpretations have shown that it is totally possible for educational organizers at the local level to master the science of open and honest dialogue on the most difficult issues. Examples? I don't think that there is a ship in our major unit on which you will still find that cold officialness which was previously often seen at united political days, during political exercises and anytime the national issue was being discussed. The comparison of opinions, with all of their differences of opinion, brought out one notable fact—an impartial truth is better than formal unfounded optimism. People must see how much work has to be done to master the culture of multi-nationalities relationships in the military collective so that people always feel a comrade's reliable shoulder around and live in unity and agreement and also see at times how easily all of this is disrupted because of a lack of attention toward the national peculiarities of soldiers, a lack of respect for the national traditions, or because of someone's exceptional arrogance, haughtiness, national conceit, egoism, reservedness and aloofness.

However I really don't want to talk about indifference. As you can imagine, the work of educating personnel in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and internationalism for the sake of the high ideal of defending socialism and protecting our united Fatherland at this stage has gone far beyond the bounds of "pure" propaganda and agitation. Its main goal is to achieve radical changes in the content and systemality that embrace absolutely every sphere of army and navy life and to become exceptionally scientific in nature.

It is undoubtedly true that commissions and groups are being set up at political agencies and party committees to get involved in the problems of multi-nationality relations. But as we do this, I hope that we do not fall into the old errors that caused times when good concepts were not backed up with business-like execution.

I know that there are places where people are asking if we are not amusing ourselves with these illusions about the effectiveness of those commissions and groups and whether anything has changed in their appearance. Their uneasiness is justifiable. Their show of activity is actually only causing irritation. And if everything again comes to nothing but paper creativity, the idea will be ruined. I personally feel that the main thing, one that is practical within the sphere of daily service, is that the national interest of all servicemen boils down to setting up strict regulatory order, guaranteeing that everyone without exception is equal in regard to regulatory requirements, and maintaining an equal and even attitude toward every man. If you think about it, the various conflicts that we have had have been given a national coloration not because Ivan's "characteristics did not agree" with Akhmed's or Bakhtang's with Guseyn's (although this does happen), but rather because regulations are often generally violated. The training process includes violations in its setup, the service organization leaves much to be desired, daily duty details do a poor job of carrying out their responsibilities, and so forth. It is here, in these deviations from the regulatory line, that one should most often and first of all seek the reasons for the origin and manifestation of mutual hostility.

Or take social and domestic conditions. For example, we habitually attribute the poverty that is often manifested in visual propaganda when covering the subject of the friendship and unity of our peoples as gaps in international education and we are uneasy if few books and periodicals in national languages arrive at military libraries. That is, we attempt to watch after spiritual sustenance, at times forgetting that the people's way of life also has an expressed social aspect which also has a direct influence on the atmosphere in the collective and on the development of relations among people.

For example, the saying that "objective reality defines consciousness" is very obvious in the example of the notorious two-tiered system. No wonder company starshina's [sergeants major] nickname this "structure," one which we have not yet eliminated once and for all for these many years, a "source of increased danger." And we should generally note here that the intra-barracks "hierarchy" which has not been immediately overcome in some places is most often precisely parasited onto some type of domestic discomfort.

For some reason even now there is a steadfast conviction that there is nothing that promotes cohesiveness more than jointly overcoming general "rigors and deprivation," yet people do not have in mind those concepts that are established in regulations, but something totally

different. In my opinion this is fundamentally wrong. And more so in that life has shown that there are almost no difficulties that are common, that is, the same for everyone. One sees striking contrasts both in domestic conditions and in attitudes toward spiritual demands on personnel even within one unit.

For example, how should we react to the fact that a national music ensemble was started on the patrol boat Pezkiy, whereas adjacent ships only pined for one in envy, watching the brilliance with which amateur talent concerts are given. The complaints about the lack of talent, the lack of instruments and so forth look very unconvincing against this background. Difficulties of this type can be explained in only one way—by a lack of interest, ingenuity and organizational principles.

Finally, I think that life springs from a state of rest and prolonged shifting and those who are still dozing do not want to note the changes that are taking place around themselves. Yes, life is a strict teacher. We like to allude to its lessons, but still primarily in the past. When you are faced with a completed fact, like it or not, you have to do something. And if I am to be totally frank, we rely primarily on written documentation. It has become correct to plan even ongoing work in no other way than in "light" of some instructions and directives.

Someone may ask what is wrong with tactfully listening to impulses from above. Of course there is nothing bad or good in that. But it wouldn't hurt us to learn also how to adjust carefully to impulses from below, compare short- and long-term forecasts ourselves and stay alert as we work.

For example, people in the Navy are noticing that from year to year graduates from senior political-military schools, those from whom we especially expect fresh ideas and an innovative approach in this area, are obviously immediately lost when confronted with all the complexities of the multi-nationality relationship problem. This year while our major unit got to know the graduates of the Kiev VVMPU [Higher Naval Political School] we found that none of the lieutenant political workers was able to sensibly answer the question of what they saw as the peculiarities involved in party political work in a multi-nationality military collective. This is rather bad for professionals. It is long past time for our military schools to consider the real demands of army and navy practice.

And the junior officers must have practical as well as theoretical knowledge so that they can repeat experiences that have already been worked out in units, on board ships and in subunits and thus make a start. Here is an example. The ship commanded by Captain Lieutenant A. Vasilyev recently returned from a difficult extended cruise. As we all know, there are many significant psychological stresses associated with accomplishing this combat mission. But one can also put the monotonous environment with its many brutal limitations in a light tone if one so desires. On a trawler the sailors' birthdays are such unique events in the course of a cruise weekday.

People felt that a personal holiday was an excellent chance to select a person whose name day it was and also point out his small Motherland, his republic, oblast, city and village in some special way. Although the trawler has a small crew, it is still multi-national. It is a sort of mini-portrait of Soviet society with complex tanglings of history, fates and characters. So the ship's communists have showed special concerns for this unity of patriotic and international conviction.

In speaking about the shipboard level as a foundation in which the training and educational process is ongoing we nonetheless recognize that there is absolutely no way that you can shift absolutely everything that has not been taught at various stages somewhere else to this locale. This especially applies to organizing exercises for soldiers who have a poor mastery of the Russian language. In my opinion the subunit groups that study Russian cannot solve this entire problem. And even more so because few special textbooks reach these areas (for example, no new textbooks have arrived in Kamchatka for about three years now). At times ship commanders have been forced to assign some young sailors into sections and commands not by their military training specialties, but rather by the fact that they learned to speak and understand Russian faster. This, for example, is what was done with sailor R. Usmonov, an Uzbek by nationality, on the patrol boat Lun this spring. This was immediately reconfirmed when he arrived at the crew of seaman gunners and boatswains where the section was a starshina with good pedagogical inclinations.

It is clear that such perturbations are not the best solution to this situation. It is now too costly to provide the graduates with those things that they did not get at home and in school. But once the Navy has assumed those functions, wouldn't it be smarter to concentrate on them at the first place in the training detachment? For example, spend a month there on Russian language studies for those who need it.

People are correct in saying that everyone goes through the school of patriotism and internationalism in his own way. But it has to be done in practice. One's consciousness is developed from what you see around you and everything is a result of your own experience. And this is why the seriousness of our intentions to educate soldiers based on the foremost ideas of perestroika must definitely acquire a practical manifestation as soon as possible.

Baltic MD Press Conference Covers Environment, Local Civil-Military Relations
18010248 Moscow SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 30 Sep 88 p 3

[Article by L. Batura and B. Sebyakin, LATINFORM correspondents: "The Baltic MD: On the Way to Renewal"]

[Text] Questions of the activity of the armed forces of the country concern every Soviet person in the most

direct way. The army defends the peaceful labor of the people. Its influence on the moral climate of the society is unquestionable. Its significance as a school of courage, patriotism and ideological training is universally recognized. What kind of school will this be? Not only the fate of many young people, but also the success of the creation of the party and of the entire nation, and the cause of restructuring and renewal, will depend on the answer to this question to a significant degree.

A press conference was held at the Riga district officer's club in which the following took part: Lt Gen F. I. Melnichuk, first deputy commander of the Red Banner Baltic Military District; Maj Gen V. I. Sein, first deputy chief of the political directorate of the district, and Col V. I. Terenzhev, chief of the department of propaganda and agitation and deputy chief of the political directorate of the district.

Opening the press conference, Maj Gen V. I. Sein observed that the restructuring that is going on in the country affects all aspects of the life of society, including the army. It is impossible without the press and without a truthful elucidation of the processes that are taking place in the armed forces.

Among the questions that came from the editorial staffs of newspapers, television and radio, there were also those which touch upon the attitude of the soldiers of the district to problems of environmental protection. The population of the republic is expressing concern: do not the operations of military units adversely affect the ecological situation in Latvia?

Representatives of the district gave assurances that recently the efforts of the command on environmental protection were noticeably energized. In cases when military personnel are at fault for damaging nature, they make compensation in an obligatory way, and the officials who are to blame for this are held responsible according to the law. Strict control has been established for the observance of the terms that all unit activity must be conducted only within the limits of that territory which was earmarked by local authorities for exploitation. But life does not stand still. And therefore at times it becomes necessary to change, for example, a route for the movement of military equipment and a transport line of march. In all cases, when claims are made on the part of residents, ways have to be sought together with local soviets to correct the situation.

It was observed that every unit commander has special reception hours for citizens. In the event that any problems arise, one can always turn directly to the military unit for an explanation. The commander must give an appropriate answer to the question in the course of 7 days. There is one more official body to which a citizen can turn—the garrison commandant. The commander is obligated personally to examine the problem and to report on command to the senior commander and to give a reply.

The command authorities give a lot of attention to improving political educational work in the forces. Recently, a military council was held on international relations with the participation of the first secretary of the central committee of the Communist Party of the republic of the Soviet Baltic. A list was drawn up of joint measures of establishments, educational institutions, party committees, Soviet organs, and organizations of young people with military units. The practice of work on education in the spirit of internationalism took shape. A lot of measures are taking place in labor collectives where servicemen are participating. And a beginning is made during personnel registration, during callup. These days conversations and meetings are being held with veterans and reserve soldiers. The republic's "Salang" club of soldier-internationalists is actively participating in this work. Lessons are conducted with young people in military schools, visits are made to units, and meetings are held with veterans. Clubs of future soldiers are operating. Those who are sufficiently seized by such patriotic training do not later tolerate mutual relationships that are at variance with regulations and that do not correspond to the demands that are made on the armed defenders of the motherland.

Glasnost and the army. It would seem that these are incompatible concepts. However, now both glasnost and democracy are finding wider application in the army. The democratic rights of all echelons and strata of the armed forces have been broadened. As an example, a regimental commander previously never rendered a report before a local party organization, and now he does. The rights of local party organizations have been broadened. And in reality, decisions are not made without the participation of the party organization, including advancements, personnel transfers, promotions and awards. Soviets of sergeants and soldiers that render their own judgments and proposals for approval by the commander are springing up everywhere. This helps resolve questions and increases the authority of the commander—from sergeant to the commander of the district.

The thought was expressed at the press conference that it is necessary under current conditions to lower the threshold of secrecy significantly. Commenting on this proposal, F. I. Melnichuk observed that there always has been and always will be a threshold of secrecy on military questions. And it is determined by higher army organs.

It is another matter that at times some people are ready literally to make everything secret that concerns the activities of the armed force. If one of the servicemen commits an infraction of the law and is not a model of high cultural behavior, he has to be criticized for this, including in the press. But it should be done in such a way so as not to damage that prestige which the Soviet armed forces rightfully won over more than 70 years of its existence.

Many questions that have been raised in the press of the republic recently were also not shunned in the course of the press conference. Will territorial military formations

be created? Does the district intend to return the building of the Riga officer's club? Should not the term of service in the army and the number of troops be reduced? Will the system of student military training be changed?

Answers were not received to these and other questions, raised by the public not very long ago, that would completely satisfy all of the participants at the meeting. But, most likely, no one expected this. The resolution of some problems requires special resolutions of the government of the country and orders of the minister of defense. And so, certain questions still remained open after the press conference.

In the course of the press conference, proposals and desires were expressed to employees of the mass media about how to improve dealing with the press, television and radio on the activities of the armed forces and their ties with the local populace. It was emphasized that frequently to remove tensions that arise it would be quite opportune to inform the public of the position of

the command authorities of the Baltic MD on one or another pressing question associated with the army.

Also examined were questions of giving assistance to the disabled from among soldier-internationalists and to activities of informal associations of reserve soldiers, the employment in training of servicemen with combat experience received in the Republic of Afghanistan, and specific negative cases of behavior of servicemen.

"We came to the meeting with you with an open mind," Maj Gen V. I. Sein said in conclusion. "And therefore a request: also understand our concerns and problems, do not attribute to the army that which does not afflict it, and do not make far-reaching conclusions on the basis of individual facts. I think that new meetings with you will serve mutual understanding. The training year is now ending in the forces, and the district is getting ready for an end-of-training-period performance evaluation. During it, the best soldiers will show themselves. Let them become heroes of your material! And we, in our turn, are ready to respond to all of your requests.

Women's Council Complaints of Housing Construction Problem in Transbaykal MD
18010237a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Oct 88 First Edition p 2

[Article by S. Timoshenko, Garrison Women's Council Member, Transbaykal Military District: "About the 'Residual' Principle"]

[Text] I am writing you in the name of the Women's Council with a request for help in breaking down the bureaucratic chains hobbling the construction of a 60-apartment building for the families of garrison servicemen. According to documentation, they have been building it since 1980.

Until now there has been a lot of hope associated with the construction of that building. The difficult climatic conditions in this area and especially the disorder in the lifestyle here is making service difficult for officers. How can you demand full return from an officer when his family and young children do not have a very necessary thing—a roof over their heads?

At the present time every seventh family does not have living space and 20 families are doubling up to live. It is impossible to take a room in town. Unit depots and Lenin Rooms are being used for housing. What happens is that officers spend the night in the barracks with the soldiers. At times they have to wait years until someone gives up his quarters.

And officers with families come to this garrison. Those who are lucky get quarters from the people they are replacing or are set up in the hostel. Officers' wives invariably have to answer the question of whether they should leave with the children and go to live with parents. How do you maintain a family? The Women's Council is trying to support them, but you do not create a building with promises and sympathy.

What is slowing its construction? According to the orders and other documents, the customer, the district KEU [Housing Operation Administration], prepared the entire estimate documentation draft in a timely manner and submitted it to the contractor. Years went by, but building construction did not begin. Construction and erection work valued at 100,000 rubles was to be done in 1987, but only a little more than half was completed.

Then came 1988. Construction was shifted to the UNR [Office of Work Supervisor] headed by Lieutenant Colonel V. Novitskiy. Thirty construction soldiers headed by Lieutenant A. Boyko showed up at the site, but frankly speaking, work did not get into full-swing. And what can the construction people do if their orders for the delivery of the construction material that they need and the spare parts for their construction equipment are not filled. For example, it was time to do the foundation work and there was no place to get the 55 cubic meters of standard macadam.

UNR leaders do not plan to put the building into operation in the very near future, citing the importance of completing other sites. And we are getting no real assistance from the district. It is obvious that people there also consider this a construction site that is for social uses and therefore of secondary importance and are using the notorious "residual" principle.

The first light frosts of the morning and the silvery hoar-frosts on the design of the "long term construction project" remind us that the Siberian winter will soon be upon us; this is a time of quiet at construction sites. The unit command, the Women's Council and especially those families who have no place to live are hoping that at least next year we will be able to celebrate a housewarming.

Correspondents in our district newspaper NA BOYEVOM POSTU have often written about our "long-term construction site." But critical materials and the answers to them are not changing the essence of the matter. To this day the construction of the building is in the initial stages and is not moving from dead center.

Response to A. Sakharov Proposal on Reduction of Draft Term of Service
18010247 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 19 Oct 88 p 2

[Article by V. Pogrebenkov, APN military columnist: "How Long Should a Soldier Serve?"]

[Text] Academician A. Sakharov, speaking at a conference of the Pugwash movement in Dagomys, proposed a unilateral reduction in the term of service in the Soviet armed forces and their numerical strength by half. He justified his proposal by the fact that there is not one state at the present time which would threaten the USSR with an attack.

The ideas of Academician A. Sakharov about changes in the Soviet military structure were met with interest in the USSR and abroad. His proposal was received in different ways in our country. And this is quite natural. I think that the official point of view on this score should be laid out by competent experts in the USSR Ministry of Defense. Not substituting for them, I would like to express my personal judgments on this question.

Let us begin with the main thing. Does the United States intend to attack the USSR? I think not. I am convinced to an equal extent that the Soviet Union does not have any aggressive intentions.

So, there is no threat? By no means. The reality is such that both sides possess multimillion groups of forces that are equipped with thousands of missiles with nuclear loads. And these missiles potentially constitute a tremendous danger. Here lies one of the paradoxes: acknowledging the ruinous nature of war from political and

military standpoints, both sides are continuing to maintain armed forces that are capable of conducting not only defensive operations but also major offensive operations. Although the new Soviet military doctrine promulgated in 1987, as well as the military doctrine of the states participating in the Warsaw Pact, proposes shifting to the principle of defense sufficiency only.

One of the reasons for such a paradox apparently resides in the fact that, as a rule, the army is manned and equipped on the principle not so much of reasonable sufficiency as of necessary redundancy. This really is the psychology of national security: to safeguard it, a surplus is preferable to a shortage. Therefore, as a result of a chain reaction in the arms race, each of the sides has a "surplus"—everything that has been accumulated above the norm of reasonable defense sufficiency. It is really necessary to reduce this "surplus"—it can constitute a very substantial percentage, and it should be set by experts taking into account the military potential of the adversary.

But what can be expected, if such a reduction is carried out on a unilateral basis? Of the advantages—an unquestionable moral gain in the eyes of peace-loving foreign circles and an advantageous propaganda position to put pressure on the other side? And the shortcomings? These are a disruption of the parity acknowledged by both sides, with all of its "surpluses," imbalances and asymmetries in armaments and personnel strengths. Evidently, it should also be recalled that the unilateral reduction of our armed forces at the beginning of the 1960's by 1.2 million persons did not find support and adequate actions on the part of the West. Therefore, the safest path of disarmament is bilateral.

In my view, reduction in the numerical strength of the armed forces can be accompanied by two changes in the terms of service, either by an increase or by a decrease. In the first case there are problems of an economic and a demographic nature. Therefore, a shift of the army and navy to 3- and 4-year terms of service, respectively, about which rumours are spreading so persistently, is unlikely.

A simultaneous reduction in the terms of service and numerical strength, in the opinion of specialists, could severely undermine the combat capability of the armed forces.

It will be recalled that a majority of the NATO armies are hired [naemnyye]. This means that a soldier completes his initial contract in 3-4 years of service, and afterwards he can extend it. Is it conceivable to imagine in our country, let us say, a tank driver who in the course of 4-6 years is improving his professional skill? Further: the average age of a NATO soldier—23 to 24 years of age—is higher than that of our soldier. If you take their sergeant corps—and this is the backbone of any army—then at an average age of 26-28 years, the average service is 8-10 years.

Of course, it would be inexpedient for us to copy the NATO armies. But we should seriously think about the proposal of Academician A. Sakharov. Especially after the 19th party conference, when a specific task was established: while maintaining a high combat capability, go over to qualitative principles of manning the Soviet armed forces.

Description of NATO Officers' Presence at Exercises Under CDE Accord

18010126 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Oct 88 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents Maj O. Vladyskin and Maj Yu. Mamchur: "Fire, Maneuver and... Diplomacy: What Lies Behind the Already Customary Phrase: 'Foreign Military Observers Invited to the Exercise'"; first two paragraphs are letter from Maj I. Baskakov]

[Text] *Dear editors. Lately the newspapers, radio and television more and more often report the presence of foreign military observers at military exercises. In accordance with provisions of the document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe, representatives of 26 states also were invited to an exercise held on the territory of Belorussia in the latter half of September. What did their work consist of? How were the relations with our servicemen? And in general, who are these foreign military observers?*

I believe these questions are of interest not just to me.

The photographers implored:

"Move away! Step aside!"

The photo was worth it. American Maj Gen H. Taylor squatted down at the breastwork and struck up a conversation with our machinegunner through his Russian-speaking assistant. Jr Sgt P. Krayovskiy did not forget his job in the meantime: a guest was a guest, but he did not lose sight of his sector of fire. By the way, this did not interfere with the dialogue in the least.

"Where was I born? Near Lvov. How long have I served? One and a half years. And how do you like the company position?"

"It's good," acknowledged the general with a smile, but very seriously. "I am especially impressed that you prepared it so quickly."

"When it's necessary, it's necessary," remarked Pavel tellingly.

Taylor inquired whether or not Krayovskiy had had previous contact with American generals

"No," responded Pavel. "And how about you with Soviet soldiers?"

"Also no."

The general drew an Army emblem from the bottomless pocket of his field uniform.

"This is for you as a memento."

"Thank you," said Krayovskiy. "Well, since that is the case..."

And he also dug into his pocket.

"This is a view of my city," he said, handing the general a postcard.

Meanwhile one of the foreigners went up to a tank at a combat position and ran his finger over the inside surface of the barrel.

"When did you clean it last?" he asked the crew commander.

"After firing."

"Do you think this is enough to ensure the gun fires well?"

"Our gun doesn't miss!" Jr Sgt V. Kiselev assured him. Privately with his comrades he remarked:

"A serious man... Do you think fouling is on his mind? He determined the type of gun—rifled or smoothbore."

After visiting another "point" the observers were again taking their seats in the "Ikaruses," which were provocatively bright for a training area. But seemingly remembering something at the last minute, Maj Gen Taylor made a beeline back to the North Battalion Commander Maj S. Vladimirov. The day before at the battalion KNP [command and observation post] Vladimirov briefed the foreigners on the tactical situation and patiently answered their questions. At that time Taylor literally did not take his eyes from the battalion commander's face, which was fatigued and because of this seemed too stern. He asked something and immediately received a laconic reply...

Now the American shook the major's hand with feeling:

"Come see me in the States! You will be a guest!"

This probably could have been taken as a pretty gesture had there not been sincere emotion in the major general's voice.

"Believe me, I know what it is to command a battalion."

"Okay!" nodded Vladimirov with understanding.

According to the interpreters Taylor later admitted: "I would like to have such a battalion commander."

Intuition did not let the general down. The battalion commanded by Maj Vladimirov was on the South axis of the main attack, delayed the South advance and inflicted substantial damage on the opposing side. That day Swiss representative Col H.-J. Jubersachs admitted to us: "The exercise is interesting and leaves a good impression of troop operations." That was the very same reaction of many of his colleagues. It is apropos, however, to quote one more statement here: that of our officer, Gds Capt Ye. Osminin, who provided communications for the observation site. He was skeptical of the western specialists' assessments:

"Their main impressions remain in the notebooks..."

But details of what was occurring were recorded not just in notebooks. On the very first day the observers raised the question of using photographic and recording equipment. Permission was given and now they were working and leaving no doubt as to the quality of their professional training. They had a stopwatch and dictaphone in one hand, camera in the other, and binoculars—I just want to say it—in the third. Although some of them plugged their ears and even closed their eyes to the roar of attack aircraft sweeping overhead and powerful explosions, they still saw a great deal.

The "battle" was in full swing when Col V. Verbraaken from Belgium inquired about the personnel's degree of training. He and the other observers were informed that soldiers of different periods of service were among the attackers and naturally the level of their training was not the same.

The colonel was fully satisfied by the answer, but what generated the question?

"I was struck by the fact that not all soldiers are moving over the battlefield and selecting positions correctly," explained Verbraaken. "Over there you see one has hit the dirt at a road intersection. He would be immediately killed in a real battle. I say this as a former infantry brigade commander."

The Belgian officer's remark convinced us once more that the foreign observers did not miss a single detail. This fact perhaps forced us to realize more deeply the full complexity of the position of the field training exercise organizers, who along with accomplishing operational training missions were concerned with the demonstration aspect of the activity. The situation is not a simple one and honestly speaking is typical of many tactical exercises regardless of the presence of foreigners.

Thinking of the possible assessment of their work, some commanders strive for external effect of operations and in this desire often come into contradiction with common sense. An individual soldier's training fades into the

background for them. And so it was in battle drills prior to this exercise that a variant was seriously practiced where attackers moved into the assault at full height in a faultless skirmish line. The commander who was tempted by the open window-dressing in the field hardly failed to understand that such a "picture" is a far cry from actual battle, but the fact is, one wishes to make an impression... Only the intervention of a general who arrived from Moscow returned everything to regulation requirements. But so much time was lost!

"A chronic disease," Gds Lt Col A. Pavlovskiy later confided in us. His subordinates were advancing right near the observation tower. "We pay much attention to the soldier's individual training as the basis of subunit combat effectiveness. Nevertheless it is the first to suffer when we are assigned unscheduled and often short-term [konyunkturnyye] missions."

It is not difficult to understand what the officer had in mind. Where were we to get the time necessary for training each soldier if almost entire hectares in the exercise area were turfed and kilometers of little sand borders and board curbs were made along field and forest roads? The functional purpose of these and similar attributes is doubtful, but we have become accustomed to their appearance where the arrival of higher-ups is expected. In the presence of foreigners, however, it was in truth awkward to contemplate such luxuriant decor in a training area.

Even unadorned, our Army has much that generates genuine admiration in foreign guests. Powerful equipment, modern armament and, most important, the people. As we repeatedly saw, the foreigners did not conceal their heightened interest in them.

The airborne personnel's faces were ablaze. They either had not managed to cool off after the recent battle or it was from embarrassment.

"Are you embarrassed?" the exercise director asked the soldiers. "Since you invited observers to dinner, call them to the table!"

After having operated so daringly in the North rear, now they moved somehow timidly toward the people in unaccustomed military uniforms. Gds Pvt Gennadiy Shiyanov and Gds Pvt Viktor Chernookiy went up to U.S. representatives Maj Gen Taylor and Maj R. Worth. They greeted them and introduced themselves. A conversation was struck up while the cook filled the mess tins at the field kitchen. Who was born where? Who were their parents? What did the insignia on the uniforms mean? Later, pointing to a mess tent, Viktor addressed the American officer:

"Let's go in there, Comrade Major."

Worth's brows rose. Viktor also realized his inadvertence. What could he do? He was accustomed to seeing a comrade in everyone with whom he came in contact...

"How does the American youth regard the Soviet youth? And how does it regard us soldiers?" the airborne soldier inquired of Worth.

The Ranger pondered. The pause dragged out.

"They probably regard you just as you regard them," responded Worth, choosing his words carefully.

A somewhat stiff gray-haired gentleman, UK representative Brigadier Gen W. Beetles, was the center of attention at one of the tables during dinner. A great deal was discussed: restructuring; the Russian freezing weather; how a soldier who is disciplined and has initiative is a good soldier. They argued over what system for manning the army is better: universal military obligation, as we have, or for hire as they have. There were agreements on some things and differences on others.

Beetles remarked that the Belorussian landscape was very similar to that of Oxfordshire and Hampshire, counties dear to his heart ("I sometimes feel as if I am at home!"). He mentioned his daughters. We who had seen the general in other situations when he was pestering the exercise director with far from sentimental questions and remarks and was accepting far from everything on faith, automatically recalled a phrase he had tossed out the day before: "It is well that the arrows of your South and North people are not aimed in another direction."

A television reporter interrupted the conversation:

"Mister Brigadier General! Both you and we have the concept of a probable enemy."

It seemed Beetles was somewhat offended. What can you do? We had seen each other for too long only in the image of an enemy on scary posters, so the comment of the colleague from television could not be called inappropriate.

"A general like any other general," the soldiers said among themselves in the meantime after saying goodbye to Beetles. And Jr Sgt Krayovskiy's words about the Americans surfaced in memory: people like any other people.

How is one to take this reaction? When something similar is said by a student after visiting an international youth camp or by a tourist on returning from distant journeys, that is one thing. But a soldier with a weapon in his hands... You will agree that this has its nuances, and they are not just psychological. One has occasion to hear different opinions today when the talk turns to how the new political thinking is being perceived in the attitudes of diplomats, politicians, publicists and the military.

Meetings, dialogues... Addressing the airborne personnel, Maj Gen Taylor says:

"On landing from the helicopters near the observation tower, one can say that you came down like a bolt from the blue on the head of an American general. And now you are sitting at the same table with him. Doesn't this embarrass you?"

"If the American general merely plans to dine with us, what is bad in that?" responded Gds Pvt Shiyarov.

"Yevgeniy!"

"Hans?!"

Col Melyanenko and Maj Gen Unterdoerfel of the GDR Nationale Volksarmee were entangled in an embrace and peppering each other with questions about their wives and children. It turns out that they have known each other since those years when Melyanenko served in the GSFG.

An observer from the Federal Republic of Germany standing nearby looked at them with unconcealed curiosity. What was on his face? Surprise? Perplexity? Or perhaps the desire to understand something very important for him, although not at all from the sphere of military secrets.

It is no secret that we often take the words "brotherhood in arms" as depicted on posters: soldiers of seven armies stand shoulder to shoulder under a constellation of flags of Warsaw Pact member countries. Working in an exercise next to observers representing allied states and armies forces one to get a feeling for our inner kinship, commonality of thinking and oneness in destiny somehow in a new way, more clearly and perhaps more visibly.

After inspecting the command and observation post of a South tank company one of the Polish officers drew one of our people aside and a discussion began between them on specific "tankers'" problems. In a few minutes they already were on familiar terms.

Someone possibly will feel a doubt: Aren't we showing too much? Aren't we being excessively open?

"Everything demonstrated here is no longer a secret for anyone," said the deputy exercise director.

Lt Col A. Pavlovskiy is of the following opinion:

"We are showing what we not only can but must show. Let them see that we are threatening no one but are doing our soldier's job quietly and openly within the framework of existing international agreements."

The exercise was coming to an end and we were returning to Minsk. Forests on both sides of the highway were flaming in their fall attire. If the counties of which Beetles spoke resembled these marvelous places, there obviously is one more reason to reflect that we all live on the same planet and together are responsible for its fate.

The driver turned on the radio. A report about another exercise, "Autumn Forge-88" in Western Europe, was broadcast following a variety program. The Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] correspondent reported that among others there were Soviet military observers present.

Officers Native to Moscow Denied Housing in Moscow Upon Separation

18010223 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Oct 88 First Edition p 6

[Article by Colonel (Res) V. Krasovskiy under the rubric: "Response to the Written Word": "A Place of Your Own": "All Many Officers Can Do Is Dream"]

[Text] The provision of housing for officers of our Armed Forces, both those on active duty and those on reserve or retirement status, is a burning question. In my opinion, there is no other category of citizen whose rights to housing are so violated.

Let me cite one example. The very beginning of perestroika saw the renewal of a decree which served only to worsen the deterioration caused by the statute on registration of citizens in Moscow and Moscow Oblast. This legislation forbade the registration and assignment of apartments to officers on reserve or retirement status who before induction claimed Moscow or the nearby suburbs as their permanent place of residence. Although a small exception was made in the case of retiring personnel returning from the Far North, foreign duty assignments, and closed military installations, these decrees deprive former servicemen of the right to return to the place of their induction, to their relatives and friends.

With Moscow as a model, the restraints on registration for discharged officers were extended to almost all capitals of union and some autonomous republics, and to Leningrad, Odessa, Rostov-on-the-Don, Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, and the resort areas. It is a fact that the privilege of returning to the place of induction is extended to soldiers who have completed their conscription service, to all workers from areas subject to difficult work conditions, personnel who were recruited for work by organizational selection for a definite period of time - even petty criminals convicted for a single offense. Only officers and recidivists are deprived of the right to return home.

I do not think it was a concern for overpopulation that guided the Mossovet and other local soviets in the application of the prohibitory decrees, since Moscow

alone during the "stagnation" years permitted the annual "limit" of 20,000 to 50,000 workers recruited for construction, municipal services, industry, commerce, and the militia. This was true largely in the case of devastated villages located in the non-chernozem zone.

Incidentally, even an officer on active duty assigned to the capital is no less suspiciously regarded: For him and his family to be registered, an order signed by his direct superior does not suffice. Required instead is authorization by "higher authority," that is, an order signed by the minister of defense himself, while for the Moscow suburbs, the document must be signed by a first deputy.

It is my opinion that top priority in bringing up the Armed Forces to more modern times be assigned to reforming the existing situation, whereby regular officers and retiring officers and warrant officers of the Army and Navy be provided housing. The question cannot be put off. However, there is a definite tendency to consider this problem as local and temporary. The maneuverings related to shifting the responsibility for mishandling the housing problem to the local organs of authority lead me to believe that the housing situation in the Armed Forces will not change in the near future.

No housing committees operating within military districts and fleets - not even the central one headed by the minister's first deputy - can resolve the problem if they continue to travel the beaten path, placing all the blame on local soviets. There may be another round of squabbling between the Ministry of Defense and organs of soviet power, but this would improve the situation only temporarily, without addressing the social aspect, leaving unaffected the fundamental contradiction associated with providing servicemen with housing.

The housing problem in the Armed Forces is one of great social significance. Having its origin in the heyday of the "stagnation period," in the early 1970's, it has become a confusion of departmental, financial, demographic, economic, and other contradictions which cannot be untangled. It can be straightened out only by applying social and governmental solutions.

What are the current provisions pertaining to housing for servicemen?

There is an official statute stating that officer personnel and their families are to be furnished living quarters at their duty station, while housing for commissioned personnel who have been placed into reserve or retirement status is a function of executive committees of soviets of people's deputies, in accordance with a procedure established by the USSR Council of Ministers. The decree passed by the USSR Council of Ministers directs ispolkoms of local soviets to act on the behalf of discharged personnel on a priority basis, but within a period not exceeding three months after the day of the applicant's arrival.

These are good orders. And proper. However, the trouble is that all these statutes, the same as the majority of decrees passed during the years of stagnation, have not been followed for a long time. Regular officers have not been able to obtain housing for years for the simple reason that the quarters available at their duty stations are fully occupied by the families of colleagues who have completed their term of service; laborers and while collar personnel working for the Soviet Army and Navy; families of deceased veterans and their offspring; divorced wives whose former husbands have been reassigned to another station; and by other people who have long lost whatever connection they had with the Army. All these people occupying military quarters simply have no place to go.

In addition, experience has shown that it is better to remain at your place of discharge, where you do have housing. Two out of three Army and Navy retirees remain at their last duty station.

Other retirees and their families, trusting the statutes and decrees, head for the "destination of their choice" and entrust their fate to the organs of authority. After taking such a foolish action, for many years they are haunted by the questions: Where can I settle down? Who can help me find a place where I can register so that I can live on my pension, find a job for myself and my wife, and send the children to school? How to resolve the multitude of day-to-day, ethical, and family problems caused by homelessness? There truly is no end to their troubles and bitter disappointments. After the departing officer is given a grand farewell celebration, with reading of a statement of appreciation from the minister of defense for conscientious service and awarded the Armed Forces Veteran medal; after the euphoric speeches made by regular officers extolling the solid guarantees provided the officer in his forthcoming civilian life; he is later brought to face cold reality by the unmitigated suspicions displayed by the militia when he declares his intention to register and by the manifestly cool and unfriendly welcome he receives in the ispolkom housing section of the local soviet.

After an absence of 25 or 30 years from the city of his youth, the officer finds that he lost his living space long ago. Also, his relatives are either dead or in no position to offer him shelter. For this reason, the government grants him the right to register for living quarters of his choice, regardless of the sanitary conditions that may prevail there. The price of this favor becomes clear, however, when the process of registering for "living quarters of his choice" shows its insidious nature. Once you have registered, it is assumed that you already live at that address - you are no longer without an apartment, with the connotation that you must be looking for a better place in which to live, and there are many people looking for something better. Expressions of stormy indignation and waving in the air certificates and written excerpts from government statutes outlining the rights of discharged officers are of no avail.

Incidentally, the fact that a former serviceman is a veteran of international duty is no guarantee of priority handling of a housing application by the local soviet ispolkom. No wonder the USSR Procuracy recently took up the question of implementation of "secret" benefits. With this year's introduction of the law on the state enterprise and the conversion of some enterprises to the new management conditions as of 1 January 1988, the ispolkom source of a certain amount of housing increase has already shrunk by half due to municipal enterprises, in that those who are building houses independently have discontinued giving up the 10 percent of new residential space, since they no longer operate on the basis of centralized capital expenditures received from the state, relying instead on monies obtained from their profits, which are not subject to the 10 percent "assessment." After all the other enterprises convert to cost accounting and self-financing in 1989-1990, this major source of new housing will dry up completely for ispolkoms. What vehicle will ispolkoms then have to satisfy the claims filed by war and labor veterans, internationalist servicemen, and Armed Forces veterans?

The new management procedures are such that after four or five years of unbroken employment, each blue collar and each white collar worker employed by an economically strong and profitable enterprise will be able to obtain normal housing. An Armed Forces veteran who has given his "enterprise," i.e., the Ministry of Defense, 25 and more years of the most difficult labor, his energy and health, is forced to return to the national economy as an applicant for his rights.

It is said that cheap is dear in the long run. The Ministry of Defense has in fact for many years been shouldering the expenses related to housing for its retirees, in the amount of 70 to 80 percent of total demand. These apartments are virtually unrecoverable as far as the Ministry of Defense is concerned. They have been carried on the books for decades by the military, which pays the enormous expenses incurred for capital repair and maintenance subsidies. The drawback here is that the housing is not located where required by retirees. These buildings are needed by active-duty servicemen who have no apartment. Why not bring all these contradictions to their logical conclusion? Would it not be simpler, without relying on local soviets, to employ the resources and means of the Ministry of Defense to build housing for retiring servicemen in the cities and localities where they prefer to live after their discharge?

It seems to me that the Ministry of Defense should stop erecting new housing on military installations with the exception of that which is in progress or extremely necessary for the good of organizational measures. I am of the opinion that there are more than adequate amounts of this type of housing for all personnel on active duty. The resources and construction potential of the Glavvoenstroy should be directed toward providing

housing for former regular personnel and their families. This would contribute to fulfilling the housing program of providing a separate apartment for every family by the year 2000.

It is no secret that another reason why resolution of the housing problem is so slow is that the general officer ranks are not particularly affected, in that the social stratification of the stagnation period touched the Army as much as it did the rest of our society. There is some truth to the saying that a problem does not exist if it does not affect a general. In my opinion, the reply given by Lt Gen N. Lipakhin in PRAVDA of 24 July 1988 is simply an attempt to add another round to the running battle with local soviets. The GlavKEU [Main Billeting Directorate] must know that the Ministry of Defense is the sole ministry in the country that is stubbornly attempting to relegate retirees to a status of dependence in the matter of housing and that it is consistently passing to the local soviets the burden of caring for its discharged cadre.

13005

Military Legal Reform: Creation of a 'Law-Based State'

*18010244 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Sep 88 Second Edition p 2*

[Interview with Academician V. Kudryavtsev, director of the State and Law Institute and USSR state prize laureate, by Maj Justice A. Pchelintsev, candidate of juridical sciences: "On the Road to a Law-Based State. A Timely Interview"]

[Text] Academician V. Kudryavtsev, director of the State and Law Institute and USSR state prize laureate, talks about the problems of legal reform in our country and in the armed forces.

[Pchelintsev] Vladimir Nikolayevich, as is emphasized in the resolution of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference "On Legal Reform," the need arises under conditions of restructuring [perestroyka] to strengthen substantially the legal service in the soviets of people's deputies, ministries, departments and administrative bodies. What ways do you see to accomplish this task?

[Kudryavtsev] Proposals for the practical implementation of the resolutions of the party conference, including questions of legal reform as well, were developed by the July (1988) CPSU Central Committee Plenum. In particular, basically we will have to implement the restructuring of the activity of the legal service in the national economy by the middle of 1989. As you see, there is not much time, and the assigned task is big and important. Its solution is seen in not cutting legal advisers, as is done in some places under the guise of reducing the administrative staff, but, on the contrary, expanding the legal service and manning it with qualified personnel. And this is not an end in itself, but one of the guarantees for

the realization of economic reform. The legal service is called on to promote the strengthening of full cost accounting, contractual and labor discipline, the legality of administrative activity, an increase in the quality of goods and services, and the protection of the legal interests of enterprises, organizations and citizens.

[Pchelintsev] Apparently, all of this also concerns the armed forces?

[Kudryavtsev] When it comes to the armed forces, then for them the significance of the legal service is no less an important issue. For a military unit is a very complicated organism with a multitude of diverse relationships—political, economic, social, national, and specifically military. Here there are a powerful complex of equipment and weapons, a vast economy, and many thousands of collectives that are formed on the principle of the military regulation of people of many nationalities. I served for a long time after graduating from the Military Legal Academy in military justice bodies. I was convinced personally more than once that an order that is adopted under army conditions without adequate study, and more so when it contradicts the law, can entail far more serious consequences than under ordinary circumstances. But the military legal service, unfortunately, is too small in number and weak.

I know the results of an experiment to strengthen the legal service which was tested in the Moscow Military District. By the way, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, wrote about it. In my opinion, the positive results that were obtained are quite natural. I think that legal advisers are needed not only at central and district echelons of military administration, but also in combined units [soyedineniya] and large strategic formations [obyyedineniya]. And this is not a tribute to fashion, but a requirement of the present day, and a feasible way of strengthening the legal service in the armed forces.

[Pchelintsev] As is known, the resolution of the party conference set as urgent the task of ensuring legal reform by top officials [kadry]. What problems exist here?

[Kudryavtsev] Today, unfortunately, we lag developed countries considerably, even in the simple matter of the number of lawyers in the state. A no less important problem is the quality of training of lawyers. It leaves a lot to be desired. In my view, we have to move principally to a form of full-time education. In addition, along with intensive general theoretical training, specialization is needed in law VUZ's and in law departments of universities. There is also a need to better the organization of various courses for improving and raising the qualifications of lawyers.

[Pchelintsev] Do you also apply this to military lawyers?

[Kudryavtsev] Yes, unquestionably. As a graduating student of the former Military Political Academy, I can affirm that it trained highly qualified lawyers. It assembled the most authoritative research and education personnel. Right now the level of training of military lawyers, in my opinion, has dropped, and it has to be raised.

This is where I would also concentrate attention. Restructuring requires a qualitatively new approach to the work of state organs, including legal organs. A socialist law-based state is being founded. Many legal problems also arise in the armed forces, but there is no solid research and investigative legal subunit here. Nevertheless, a large legislative department existed in the 1920's at the Revvoyensovet [Revolutionary Military Council] which conducted research studies on legislative acts, and it played a big role in the implementation of military reform in the years 1924-1925. In addition, a military legislative council existed which was comprised of prominent state officials and military chiefs. You will recall what principally important military legal acts were prepared and adopted then. This really was reform.

At the present time, new legislative acts on questions of defense of the country are being readied. Military scholars should also have a say here. Our State and Law Institute and other scientific research law institutions virtually do not get involved in military legal problems. Perhaps it would be expedient to think about the creation of a scientific research center for military legal research. This would be in complete accord with the spirit of the decisions of the 19th party conference on the need to raise the role of science in the life of our society substantially.

[Pchelintsev] In your opinion, what paths will the democratization of the legislative process in the country follow?

[Kudryavtsev] It is determined by those measures that will be adopted in conformance with the resolution. This is glasnost of the legislative process, a competent scientific appraisal and discussion of the bills with participation by the public at large. I will add to this that draft laws should be prepared in an especially well-thought-out way. They must be considered more carefully and comprehensively at sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the union republics and in the press. In addition, alternative draft laws should be published and discussed. By the way, that is exactly the way it used to be earlier. Not long ago we marked the first anniversary of the Soviet constitution. In the preparation of this constitution in 1918, the range of opinions was extremely large. For example, IZVESTIYA published not only proposals that were adopted, but also those that were rejected. Not long before the opening of the 5th All-Russian Congress of the Soviets, at which the constitution was adopted, the

newspapers also published the alternative drafts. And we do not have to fear a pluralism of opinions. The more opinions and discussions there are, the higher will be the quality of the law.

I think that the armed forces should be no exception. Why should not the army and navy community discuss drafts of combined arms regulations, the Law on USSR Defense, and other bills? Society does not lose but only gains from this.

[Pchelintsev] You said in one of your speeches that new democratic institutions are being born—those elements of socialist civilization that we still lack. Apparently this shortage is felt in the armed forces. But here there are special complications caused by the specific nature of military service relationships. What is your opinion on this question?

[Kudryavtsev] Of course, there are certain complications here. But they should not be made out to be absolute. Frequently, not wanting to think and act, we ourselves create these complications, submitting too much to conservatism and fear "as if something might go wrong" ["kak by chevo nye vyshlo"].

Democratization in the army and the navy is called on to safeguard fully the rights of soldiers, as citizens of the USSR, and the role of public institutions in the life of military collectives. There is no opposition whatever here to one-man command. On the contrary, only when developing the democratism of public and political life and, together with this, affirming one-man command, can real assistance be given to commanders in improving the organization and quality of operational and political training and the strengthening of military discipline in the resolution of problems in the social sphere and practice of personnel work.

I want to talk first of all about officers' assemblies as an instrument for intensifying democratization in the army and navy. As far as I know, their status is being worked on. We have to go farther. Something like this should exist for warrant officers and petty officers and for servicemen on extended service.

Today there are no comrades' courts for the largest category of servicemen, those who are in compulsory service. They exist only for military builders. I do not know the reason for this. Although the unsettling nature of the problem is obvious. But this is an important institution of democracy. The creation of similar institutions will promote the cohesion of military collectives and the eradication from the army environment of such disgraceful phenomena as the violation of regulation rules on mutual relations. Resolution of this problem is closely connected with ensuring the legal protection of individuality and a guarantee that every serviceman will exercise his own political, economic and social rights and freedoms.

Under conditions of intensification of democracy, probably it would be useful to examine the question of preserving the principle of voluntarism in the performance of service by officer personnel not only in the manning stage. I have in mind the possibility of an officer voluntarily leaving active military duty after the passage of, let us say, several years. Why not do this? The argument is hardly convincing that then there will not be anyone to serve. On the other hand, I am confident that the state will show more interest in officer personnel and will better stimulate their conscientious work. In a word, we have to think carefully here.

[Pchelintsev] A component part of legal reform is the organization of general compulsory education [vseobuch] in law as a single comprehensive all-state program that encompasses all layers of the population and all personnel at main headquarters [tsentr] and locally. What dictates this?

[Kudryavtsev] The organization of general compulsory education in law is an objective behest of the time which has been evoked by the necessity to ensure that the population and officials are literate in law. Adherence to legality must become a conscientious and permanent rule. It is obvious that this requires that, at a minimum, people must know the laws and understand them. Consequently, real access to information about laws in force is necessary. I will not err if I say that people today are experiencing a famine in information on law. Ignorance of laws, the more so their neglect, costs the society and citizens too much. It is enough to mention such "sore" points as the protection of the rights and legal interests of former soldier-internationalists and the provision of living accommodations for officers and warrant officers. There are frequent cases of direct violations of laws that exist on this score.

The role of law in the life and activity of the armed forces is great. All servicemen, regardless of their service situation, have an equal responsibility before the law. The specifics of military relations are such that they are under stricter legal regulation. Firm law and order is a constant condition of the high combat readiness of troops. That is the way it has always been.

Commanders have to make decisions every day that relate to the realization of legal norms which impact various questions of the life and activity of the troops, including the rights and interests of servicemen and other citizens. A high legal culture is therefore necessary to every officer, and first and foremost to commanders and chiefs of staff.

Speaking on the whole, it is through general compulsory legal education, as a component part of legal reform, that the path to the formation of a socialistic law-based state lies.

Maj Gen Prokhorovskiy: Critical Response to Complaints on Regimental Economy

*Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Sep 88 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Maj Gen V. Prokhorovskiy, Chief of Finance, Moscow Air Defense District, under the rubric Discussion of Regimental Economic Problems: What Should Be Used as a Basis, Emergency Purchases at the End of the Year; How Exactly Should Funds Be Managed!; But It Is More Obvious to the Commander]

[Text] Major A. Plotnikov's article, "There Is Money, But Nothing to Pay With", which was published on 21 April 1988, has been discussed for several months already on the pages of this newspaper. Judging by the readers' responses, the article forced officials in military units as well as workers in financial services to start to think, and the issues raised are indeed painful and demand solutions. However, while reading the readers' letters, I arrived at a conclusion: every last one of the statements lacked substance. After entering the argument, the authors, as a rule, do not offer any suggestions.

It is well known that people love counting money. This wisdom was thought of by Lieutenant Colonel N. Valin during a conversation with me and it did not appear to me that this was said for the purpose of being witty. However, I rejoiced in this officer prematurely. As soon as I had an opportunity to examine his financial activities a little more closely, I discovered that in practice Nikolay Mikhaylovich does not follow this golden rule. For example, the peak of his unit's financial operations occurred in the last quarter of the year. The money laid there motionless, as the saying goes, for three quarters and then suddenly all of it was put into circulation. What is the reason for this?

This is so that there would not be a surplus of funds at the end of the year—Lieutenant Colonel Valin explained his actions.

It was for this purpose that everything was purchased, figuratively speaking, in succession. By way of illustration, so much office equipment, floor polish, and lamps were purchased that an entire ministry could have been furnished, let alone a unit headquarters building. And it must be stated that this is not an isolated incident. Many unit commanders behave the same way. The facts force us to wonder: are only the unit commanders to blame for this?

In my opinion, the whole problem lies in the existing system of budgeting according to the estimate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Included in the budget is a procedure for spending funds which is characterized by excessive detail, rigid restrictions, and requirements to spend money only during the fiscal year. I think the framers of this document wanted to promote systematic and cautious spending. However, their good intentions,

in my opinion, turned in an unexpected direction: commanders have learned that all allocated funds definitely must be spent and not to allow a surplus of funds, otherwise the planned amount for the next year would be "cut".

In pursuing precisely this objective, other commanders are completely violating socialist legality. Cases exist of using government funds to provide services for inspection committees. In the unit where Lieutenant Colonel N. Gerasimov serves, the matter went so far as to arrange banquets for them. It became necessary to intervene and stop the manipulation of government funds and to make officials accountable for their actions. And severe party penalties were imposed upon Communists V. Kolesnikov and S. Braynin.

I think drastic measures are required in order to change the psychology of commanders. First and foremost, changes are required in the very procedure of using financial resources in the unit. I think these resources could be combined into five large funds: personnel pay and allowances, capital construction and repair, social and cultural requirements, combat and political training and education, and maintenance of equipment and arms. The last three funds, in my opinion, must have constant and immutable norms, which are established by the appropriate agencies, whereas the financial resources which are allocated to the armed forces are spent according to the plans which were developed by the units' headquarters. I will try to explain the proposed plan in detail.

I think one could include in the pay and allowances fund, the monetary allowances for servicemen, the salaries for workers and other employees, temporary duty pay, relocation allowances, travel pay, rewards for suggestions for improving productivity. The second fund would include all the items from the Ministry of Defense's estimate for capital construction and repair. I think the procedure for gathering and using the financial resources in these two funds can remain as it was before.

I would assign payment for food service supplies, janitorial, postal-telegraph, and bath house-laundry expenses, funds for ongoing repairs, and for the purchase of medical supplies to the fund for the socio-cultural requirements of unit personnel. The fund for combat and political training of personnel could include the financial resources for rewards for servicemen for improving the training process, as well as for maintaining culturally enlightened institutions. And finally, the fifth fund would include the financial resources for purchasing supplies and spare parts for combat equipment and arms and also for providing communications equipment and supplying fuel.

For the last three funds, I think it will be necessary to develop rates of payment for each type of expenditure and for each supply agency to have its own regulations. In this arrangement the unit commander would annually

receive a firmly fixed sum of money according to the rates and would spend the money according to the priority of the missions, which are being conducted. All the money which was not used during the year could be entered into the unit fund.

There is still one very serious problem which hampers the systematic and expedient use of budget allocations—this is “obtaining” by all possible, and in many instances simply illegal means the required material goods. In recent years, the provision of building materials to the military units has become especially poor.

What are the commanders doing? In violation of the existing rules for purchasing material goods, they allow payments of large sums of money to accountable officials on supplies. As KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already written, this damages both retail trade, where a shortage of goods is created, and the Ministry of Defense's budget because retail prices are 10 percent higher than government wholesale prices. At the same time, one can understand the actions of the unit commander, who, otherwise, could not ensure normal living conditions to the soldiers in the barracks.

The combined efforts of the state supply agencies and the Ministry of Defense's supply offices are required to solve this problem. But we cannot allow the existing system of purchasing material goods to remain unchanged because during the transition of the national economy to one of direct contractual relations, the unit commander will not be able to endure the competition with self-sufficient enterprises which possess a much more developed apparatus.

There is no doubt that all of these suggestions are disputable, they require further analysis. At the same time, it is absolutely clear: unit commanders need more independence, their actions are restricted by petty surveillance.

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Discussion of Regimental Economics Continues

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Aug 88 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel L. Sarychev, Chief of Administration, Central Finance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, “Requirements and Capabilities—The Discussion of Regimental Economic Problems Continues”]

[Text] I would like to express my opinion on a number of issues, which were touched upon during the course of discussion. The editorial comment to Major A. Plotnikov's article, “There Is Money, But Nothing to Pay With”, which was published 21 April, noted that the issues which the author touched upon are disputable. The rash of articles which have been published by this newspaper over the last several months also address this.

What light have they shed on the issue? Along with the important problems, which we will have to solve, there is also... incompetence, the real “Achilles heel” of many commanders and other officials in managing the military economy. However, the shoddy work of the local finance services are partly to blame for this situation: we interpret the provisions of military-financial legislation poorly.

Many authors discuss the need to improve the regimental economy. Indeed, the outdated regulations and directives must be changed. And this work is being accomplished in strict accordance with the decisions which are being made by government agencies. Of course, law and the realities of life don't always go hand-in-hand, but I feel if a law has not been repealed, it must be observed, and matters must not be allowed to take their own course. Otherwise we are threatened with pure chaos.

Lieutenant Colonel V. Zverev in his article, “It is not Only a Matter of Money” (6 May), in my opinion, related in a completely objective and intelligible manner the changes which are already occurring in the financial-economic activities of the armed forces and the expansion of military unit commanders' rights to allocate financial resources. He also mentioned the shortcomings of the List of Expenditures as estimated by the USSR Ministry of Defense and which is currently being revised by our Central Finance Directorate. By the way, this is not a matter which can be accomplished in one day nor even in one month. In my opinion, Major General V. Sklyar (30 July), Lieutenant Colonel R. Andreishchev (16 July), and retired Colonel P. Veshchikov (29 July) have published well-reasoned and substantive articles in this newspaper.

And then there is Colonel G. Golovin, the author of the publication, “Prisoner of Old Directives” (7 June) which seems to me to yield to sheer emotionalism. He correctly writes that we must get rid of outdated documents, but one of his examples was poorly chosen. The author indicated that the leading document on declaring the allocation of funds for the economic expenses of military units, headquarters, directorates, and institutions was published in the pre-war period.

If one does not know the true state of affairs, this fact appears even more depressing. It is true that these regulations are indeed out of date, but officially since 1985 they have not been used in practice. Instead of these the armed forces are guided by differentiated schedules of financing which are being developed.

The actual requirements of the armed forces, particularly those for economic expenses, as a rule, are completely satisfied. Suffice it to say that in 1987 alone, the Air Defense Forces, in which, by the way, the author of this article serves, there remained a surplus of approximately 200 thousand rubles, which were additionally allocated

for economic expenses at the end of the fiscal year. These funds were "carried over" to this year and can be used as an additional source of financing.

The issues which were raised by Lieutenant Colonel of the Guards V. Durov in his article "Independence...by Installments", published 24 June, provoked objections from me as an expert.

In reality, financial resources are transferred to the military units at the beginning of each month at a rate of one-twelfth of the annual allocation. But this does not limit the actions of the commander in the least because it is stipulated in this arrangement that if the unit's actual expenses for the coming month are more or less than the established sum, the commander is obliged to report this to the financial allowances agency not later than the 25th day of the current month.

Giving a military unit its entire annual monetary allocation at one time is simply unreasonable. In the first place, even the Central Finance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense does not have that kind of money in its accounts; secondly, this would require withdrawing enormous sums of money from circulation which would hurt the state.

Now about the vehicle shipments over long distances, which, among other things, V. Durov wrote about in his article. I would like to say in this regard, that the List of Expenditures as estimated by the USSR Ministry of Defense provides for everything not quite like the author of the cited article asserted: automobile shipments at distances up to 50 kilometers must be accomplished by vehicles belonging to the military units. It is allowed to pay for shipments over longer distances from allotted appropriations, that is to say to use transportation services of other agencies. For the present, no one has changed this arrangement.

Warrant Officer V. Oleynichenko in a letter, which was published 31 May, in my opinion, touched upon some important aspects of the matter. Among other things, he wrote about the restrictions on purchasing material goods for cash downpayment. On 1 April, the upper limit for such purchases was raised to 100 rubles. More than likely, no exceptions will be made when even this amount turns out to be too little. But what is the problem with this? I will explain. Everything that is sold on the retail market is intended primarily for the civilian population. To push one's way into the retail market with money which has been set aside for maintaining military units—means intensifying a condition which is already very complex with regard to observing the law of money circulation in the country.

The author of the letter also suggested establishing one article of law for all expenditures and giving commanders the right to decide for themselves, what to buy and where to buy it. There are many similar proposals, but I think that this is impossible to do for a number of

objective reasons. The primary reason is that the state determines appropriations strictly according to the special categories included in the structure of the Ministry of Defense's estimate of expenditures: for monetary allowances, for temporary duty pay, for communal necessities, for equipment maintenance and repair, etc. In our agency funds are distributed so as to ensure the accomplishment of assigned missions. Therefore, at the present time, giving the commander "one bag of money" is an absolutely unrealistic act.

In my opinion, the contradiction between law and the realities of life are didactically illustrated in Captain Second Class L. Shcherbakov's article (31 May). In this regard, I would like to carry on with this theme. As I have already stated, the rules for selling goods for cash to organizations, including military units, have been changed. This matter has been set in motion by mutual efforts. But on the other hand, there are cost limitations on ball point pens which are purchased for classroom activities, and this obviously should be relegated to "local independent activity", because official orders from higher headquarters do not exist on this account. Of course, one must approach this rationally and frugally, proceeding not only from requirements, but from capabilities as well, that is to say live within one's means. And I dare say, the practice of cost reimbursements for purchases of large supplies of classroom material, which Captain Second Class Shcherbakov complained about, has been carried to a blatant extreme.

Of course, there are also many other problems and unresolved issues in the regimental economy. First and foremost, and this has been commented upon in a number of publications, this is an economy consisting of all types of resources, including ammunition, fuel, and electrical power. What we are referring to here is not a "paper" economy, but a real economy.

If, for example, a regiment economizes on rations at the expense of the secondary economy, this action in turn makes its own contribution to the resolution of the Rations Program and at the same time also increases the unit's monetary reserves. Can there really be such a small amount of reserves in the operations of the other services?

Ensuring the safeguarding of military property is linked in the most intimate manner with the problems of a workable economy. Alas, losses in this are not decreasing. There is much wastefulness in the use of electrical energy, water, and fuel. For the present, ensuring the viability of the military units' secondary economies also remains a problem. That is why the current talk of constructing living quarters by using funds which have been saved in a unit's monetary reserve, as one of our readers has suggested, is obviously premature.

But, on the whole, I think the discussion of the problems of the regimental economy in this newspaper is very useful; many sensible and intelligent opinions have been

advanced, which are worthwhile considering in our work. It would be good if commanders, political workers, and qualified logisticians from all services settled down to serious discussion. The regimental economy is not restricted by the actions of workers in the financial service. It is a complex mechanism which is not easy to manage and we must reorganize its functioning through combined efforts.

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Disruption of Battalion Training Continues Despite Division's Efforts

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Aug 88 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel M. Ovsyannikov, Commander of a tank battalion, Major Ya. Firsov, Chief of the Department of Combat and Physical Training for the Military District Newspaper "KRASNOE ZNAMYA", and Lieutenant Colonel A. Borovkov, Correspondent "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA" Northern Caucasus Military District, under the rubric "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA'S" Spot Check: Where Training Time is Being Lost—The Same Old Story...]

[Text] Even while driving up to the unit's position, one could not help but notice the soldiers who were stripped to the waist with scythes in their hands. Judging from the evenness of their suntans, this was not the first time they had mowed in the sunshine. Let's meet them.

—Private Serik Pabazhanov, tank mechanic-driver, recently arrived from a training unit.

—Were there training exercises today?

—No, we were sent here first thing this morning.

Privates G. Guseynov, S. Tarmukhanov and several other persons were working with Pabazhanov in the meadow.

After they noticed us, the officers came up.

The battalion is on detail—Captain A. Mangilev, commander of a tank company explained.—Those who were left behind are working, but after dinner, they also will leave to get ready for guard duty.

—Next week we are leaving for the training area—Captain Ye. Palkin, a second company commander, interjected.—There won't be any interruptions in combat training there.

—But was there really no training exercise which could have been arranged for these soldiers?

The question went unanswered. But what could the officers say if the decision to assign the soldiers to mowing was made by the battery commander personally, with whom we, unfortunately, did not manage to meet that day.

At the regimental headquarters it was explained: During the summer training period, tank crews train according to a system of week-long field exercises. This means that one battalion assumes guard duty and all details and housekeeping tasks, while the other two battalions conduct training without any interruptions. In theory this is an optimum arrangement. But, as a rule, it doesn't turn out this way in practice—time and again we have to use the other units to perform everyday tasks which have nothing to do with combat training. Naturally, not the entire unit, but one way or another someone is left to his own resources with nothing to do. That is the way it was this time also. At the height of the training day we counted approximately 30 soldiers at the units position, who, in point of fact, were excluded from the training process.

It should be stated that the situation is not any better among the officer ranks either. They also time and again are prevented from discharging their primary official duties. Moreover this occurs for the most diverse, and at times downright ridiculous reasons. Here is a typical example. First Lieutenant A. Yepifanov, a platoon commander, who was stopped by us, was running a "confidential" errand for the regimental commander. The day before the commander had been in an accident in his personal automobile and now he had to submit photographs of the damaged automobile to the State Automobile Inspectorate. The first lieutenant was charged with taking care of this...

And how are the training exercises being conducted at the training center? We are convinced that in this area everything is going more or less normally. One of the battalions at full strength was engaged in firing training. The day before, from the morning until late in the evening they were driving combat vehicles here. On the whole, as the tank crews themselves noted, the week-long field exercise is a real opportunity to conduct serious training. During this time, personnel are rarely removed from the unit. Thus, the experience with this type of arrangement of training exercises has demonstrated its value. Of course, if the unit commanders and others were solely interested in every training minute being used productively, as the saying goes, they would be consistent and guided by principle.

We think this proviso is important because, unfortunately, from time to time examples of a different kind are encountered. We visited the firing range where the company under the command of First Lieutenant I. Kozlov should have been engaged in training. The company actually was at the range, but it was occupied with something altogether different than what it should have been doing. Contrary to the approved schedule, the

soldiers were diligently sweeping the asphalt walkways, pulling weeds in the adjacent area, and wiping down training vehicles which were already clean.

—We have already finished firing practice—explained First Lieutenant Kozlov.—Now we are putting the place in order.

—I asked Igor Ivanovich to conclude the training exercises a little earlier and tidy up a bit,—Warrant Officer M. Dobkin, the chief of the firing range, interjected.

—A little earlier—three and a half hours?

—No way,—the officer protested.—I cut short the time allocated for firing training by a half an hour in all. And now the soldiers are working at the expense of tactics.

It turned out that the platoon commanders should have been leading the tactical training exercises that day, but they were called to refresher training. In this situation the company commander could not find anything better to do that to hand his subordinates rags and brooms...

—We are already tired of talking at meetings, conferences, and briefings about the faulty practice of removing personnel from training exercises—the chief of the division headquarters stated with a helpless gesture when we met with him.—But the problem, unfortunately, is difficult to correct. You know, there are many things in this area also which at times do not depend upon us.

—Then upon whom do they depend, for example?

—Take the battalion which Major Pozharov commands for example. Fifty soldiers with an officer in charge are already in their third week of temporary duty at the military district artillery supply depot. They will return and others will replace them there. In this case it is by the order of the military district headquarters. Of course, the people at these supply depots are not goofing off, but you see they are not training either. Although all of them will have to pass an examination.

All right—this is a sanctioned detachment, so to speak. But the majority of the orders—"decrease", "detach", and "provide" do not originate in the military district headquarters. The division command's position is unambiguous. Not a single soldier, even if he is free from detail, should be excluded from the training process. Herein lies the problem. Why is this well-defined principle not always successfully transferred into practice.

It seems that the problem here is in the very organization of military life—it does not always appear that well-defined from the officers' position. From each in each sector. For the time being the removal of troops from

combat training will not be interpreted by them as an alarm signal, nor as an extraordinary circumstance, nor will this faulty practice which is denounced at all levels of command be eradicated.

13450

Commander of Central Asian MD on Quality, Restructuring, Combat Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Aug 88 p 2

[Interview of Colonel-General A. Kovtunov by Lieutenant Colonel A. Ladin under the rubric Combat Training: Ready Reserves: On the Criteria of Quality; Colonel-General A. Kovtunov, Commander of the Central Asian Military District and delegate to the 19th All Union CPSU Conference answers KRASNAYA ZVEZDA'S questions]

[Text] [Ladin] Comrade Colonel-General, it is a principal tenet of the party that the efficiency of the Soviet military must be ensured henceforth primarily through qualitative factors with regard to equipment as well as personnel. This undoubtedly presupposes restructuring leadership style in combat training as well. What can you say about that and how is this process being carried out among the forces of the Central Asian Military District?

[Kovtunov] First of all, it must be said that the policy adopted by the party to ensure the efficiency of the military primarily through qualitative factors has enormous political significance. It underscores our aspiration to stop once and for all the competition among the branches of the armed forces. However, one must also realize that the growth in the role of qualitative factors in military affairs presupposes a further increase in vigilance and in the combat readiness of the troops and in improving all aspects of army life on the basis of strengthening the personal responsibility of each serviceman for fulfilling his duties.

This envisages an increased role for every single person and a requirement to further activate the human factor. If in the past we frequently reconciled ourselves with people passively serving out their military service, now every individual to whom arms are entrusted acquires a special status. Consequently, it is also time to halt the type of practice where according to the staff diagram an officer is, let's say, the commander of a platoon, but within the platoon he actually is not the commander...

I deliberately stress this because without this, it is a moot point. Indeed, at times our platoon commanders are called upon to fulfill every conceivable role. Of course, the corresponding higher commanders and superiors are at fault here. And the simplest solution would be for me, the commander, to sternly point this out to them. But let us look at it from their viewpoint as well. What is left for them to do if the daily functioning of every garrison, even the smallest, is inextricably linked to solving the entire heap of economic problems?

In our time one can frequently hear about the so-called "residual principle" in the development of the socio-cultural way of life in the army. That is to say in previous years culture and quality of life were the last items to receive attention. As the years passed, the commander carried the ever increasing burden of the military economy, the viability of which was often secured by extracting manpower from the combat units. Moreover, we have gone so far along this road that now we are racking our brains: how can it be accomplished so that those who should, study the contemporary art of war and someone else assumes the burden of concern with quality of life. In the psychology of restructuring there is too little thinking along these lines. Specific organizational measures are needed.

[Ladin] This is something we would like to hear about in more detail. During the preparations for the 19th All Union CPSU Conference, particularly during the discussion of the Theses in the military collectives, as you know, various suggestions were made, including those which concerned changes in the organizational structure of the Armed Forces' staff. In your opinion, which of these changes are most interesting?

[Kovtunov] There were diverse proposals. They are currently being studied and calculations are being made. But I think one proposal is indisputable: if we seriously want to achieve quality in combat training—and without this there can be no talk of any sort of restructuring in the army,—we must give each section, detachment, and platoon, in its full complement and capacity, the unconditional opportunity of training according to the plans which have been developed. For the time being, as you know, the forces of companies and batteries are frequently dispersed. The summer training period is approaching. But no one will ever have to spend a month or two with a section, detachment, or crew to experience the rhythm of the training and the camaraderie among those on alert duty and at the front lines.

About whom am I talking? Everyone, about those same officers, warrant officers, sergeants, and soldiers who are continuing to prepare the boiler rooms and heating ducts for winter, to erect buildings economically, to escort rail shipments as appointed guards, and to strengthen the secondary economies in the units... Which of these things that I have mentioned should I cross out and say "We can get by without doing this"? It will turn out that none of these things can be brushed aside, it all must be done. This means the commander has a choice: either convert entire battalions into work details or detach a few individuals from each unit. There are no other alternatives.

I am not uncovering any secrets here, and it is also well known what this leads to. During the last decade only a few of our regiments have gained the right to be called outstanding. Why is this? Is there a bad attitude toward military service in the other units? No, frequently it is

difficult to reproach a commander for his subordinate's poor performance; because the reason for the deficiencies is once again the removal of personnel from combat training, which, as a rule, occurs through no fault of the commander.

The problem, of course, is not only one of perception; but if the estimate objectively reflects the state of affairs, it may also be an index of combat readiness. The moral aspect of the problem is also troubling. Inspectors very rarely look into the reasons for shortcomings. Striving for accuracy in the training of a company or battery during total inspections, they require all soldiers who are listed on the unit roster to take an examination on combat readiness. But what kind of examination can be given if a program has not yet been developed? And it happens rather frequently right before our very eyes, a platoon commander is subjected to a humiliating procedure: he is forced to plead guilty in a situation where he is innocent. He simply was not properly allowed to reveal his talents and was deprived of the opportunity to train subordinates.

This patently outdated practice of loading the combat units with the heavy burden of economic and other tasks which are not common to their profile is not all that inoffensive. It also is not the best way to affect discipline in the military collectives.

It seems that a thorough restructuring is required in this area. I must speak frankly: if something doesn't change, we will not advance our cause and we will encounter even greater obstacles in the struggle for quality in combat and political training. An experiment could be conducted at one of our divisions by employing in it a new staff organizational structure which would be responsive to present-day requirements. Of course it is necessary to prepare carefully, to study all the issues and to take into account the experience which is available in the armies of other countries. In one word, we must act. There has already been enough talking around the problem.

[Ladin] At the artillery units' competitions for the championship of the Ground Forces, a battery representing the Central Asian Military District was unable to execute one of the tasks because of a blunder which was committed by the unit's commander, Captain V. Protsenko. The officer did not have sufficient breadth of knowledge. There are many other factors as well, which attest to deficiencies in the professional training of cadres. Improving professional training—this, apparently, is one of the primary roads to success in all of our affairs?

[Kovtunov] I remember that incident. An improperly selected position for one of the command and control vehicles severely reduced the battery's capabilities. I do not doubt that the young commander knew how he should have acted. Perhaps, in his haste he forgot. But I agree with you, one of the main ways to raise the quality

of combat training is to improve the professional standards of the officer corps. How many mistakes and illegal acts are committed by some officers just because of superficial knowledge of the requirements set forth in the military regulations and manuals. Often this is also the cause for expensive equipment breaking down. As a rule the perpetrators are punished by deductions from their pay. But I doubt whether this is the most effective way of preventing accidents and breakdowns. In this area restructuring most likely would provide greater benefit. It must be stated openly that in cases where they occur, the cause of deficiencies is the officer's incompetence and his inability to teach his subordinates to service weapons and equipment correctly and to operate them competently.

I have noticed that the party brings charges against officers most frequently for disciplinary breaches, but for some reason we rarely inquire as vigorously into a lack of assiduousness in training exercises or into shortcomings in the improvement of personnel training. Perhaps this is why some commanders confess to a principle of paying undue attention to the exterior appearance of equipment. Take a look—around machinery everything sparkles, but at the same time even the most simple adjustments are not made. This means that people have only a vague idea about machinery. How long will tanks, tractors, tools and automatic weapons last if the rules for their use and maintenance are consistently violated? The experience of the Great Patriotic War, which, unfortunately, is frequently ignored by some of our commanders, contains many examples of brutal battles where Soviet troops were not defeated by numerical superiority. We were defeated by skill, by the ability to "squeeze" everything possible out of each combat element. Therefore, why don't we use our wartime experience to learn how to increase the fighting power of our combat units without increasing them numerically?

We also have examples of this in practice. In particular, I will cite the parachute battalion commanded by Guards Captain N. Zagoveyev. In this unit they conduct fire in such a manner that at the completion of the exercise only half of the allotted quantity of ammunition is expended. Two times less than other units expend while stowing their parachutes. Recently the paratroopers conducted a combat training mission in the mountains. Under the most difficult conditions the battalion functioned in an orderly, courageous, and decisive manner. In addition to the ability to conduct combat operations in the mountains, the paratroopers demonstrated the highest degree of physical conditioning.

In this instance also I am speaking with forethought. It must be admitted that some officers do not respect physical training and sports very much. They say it is the age of technicians, the wheels are turning. True, officers who were fulfilling their international debt in Afghanistan looked at this in a different light. We are relying on these officers to improve the physical training of our personnel, but in this area it seems we also have to

proceed with a policy of strengthening the requirement. You see, no type of motivation will help if a person does not strive for physical perfection. The problem should be presented in such a manner that an officer would serve as an example in all circumstances for subordinates, and, if not, he would feel uncomfortable within the military collective.

We simply will not be able to advance without removing those deformities which prevent our qualitative growth. They also include the indifference of some officers and warrant officers to the degree of their professionalism. Let's speak honestly about this, in our day craftsmanship and a high degree of professional skill are not prestigious factors. And as you know, the highest level of professionalism and faithful discharge of duty is what has always comprised the foundation of officer authority. A platoon or battery commander who has not assured accurate fire—that is to say the one, who through his own professional incompetence reduced the efforts of his subordinates to naught—can not count on their respect. This also relates to all other aspects of an officer's activities.

[Ladin] I recall one of your discussions with officers at which I happened to be present. Many of them touched upon the housing problem. There were also some comrades who would like to get promoted a little faster, to acquire a car before they are eligible for one, and to attempt to avoid punishment for the indiscretions which they have committed. But I don't remember a single appeal, except for my own, in which a person stood up for combat training or complained about the poor quality of work or about those superiors which prevent him from working at full potential.

[Kovtunov] Indeed, unfortunately, in our society personal interests rarely coincide with those of the public. One sometimes thinks: how passionately and out in the open an officer or warrant officer would live his life for costly gadgets or for an unfinished cubicle, how does he live for his own automobile. I wish the spouse would come forward and request that her never-do-well husband not be promoted, but, on the other hand force him to serve honorably. In this area, unfortunately, "mine" more often than not pushes "ours" into the background.

It appears to me that the reason for this is the incompleteness of educational work. Often behind the aggregate of knowledge, the necessary convictions, well-defined political views and the vital stand which would correspond to the spirit of restructuring are not found in a person's soul. This means we face an even more urgent struggle for humanity.

Interview conducted by Lieutenant Colonel A. Ladin.

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Army General Snetkov Commemorates Armed Forces Day

18010204 Moscow TYL VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian

No 1, Jan 88 (signed to press 11 Jan 88) pp 25-28

[Article by Army Gen B. Snetkov: "For an Objective Assessment"]

[Text] On the eve of the glorious anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces, giving their due to the successes achieved in the past training year, commanders, political workers and specialists in the Leningrad Military District Rear Services are asking themselves again and again: Has everything been done to make restructuring a reality in the daily lives of the units and subunits, and to fulfill steadfastly the demands of the party to improve combat readiness and strengthen discipline?

Heightened responsibility for the changes taking place around them, and a desire to assess their contribution to combat readiness, training and indoctrination honestly, in the party way, are characteristic of many district military collectives. Instructive in this respect, in my view, is the style of activity of the command, and the party and komsomol organizations, of the Leningrad Guards Training Motorized Rifle Regt imeni Leninskiy Komsomol. The soldiers in this unit worked well during the past year. By strengthening discipline and regulatory order, developing the training material-technical base, and introducing advanced methods, they succeeded in successfully accomplishing the main mission—to train for the forces a large detachment of junior commanders, capable of training and indoctrinating their subordinates skillfully. Rear services specialists can take considerable credit for the achievements of this leading collective. The dining hall, supply depots, baths, unit welfare farm, and many other facilities intended to satisfy the everyday needs of the men can today rightfully be called exemplary.

However, most valuable it seems to me is the fact that the regiment above all is paying great attention to improving the combat readiness of the rear services, to training the subunits and services to operate in a situation as close as possible to that of combat, and to creating the necessary conditions for the reliable storage and timely transport of materiel supplies, and the repair and maintenance of equipment.

Yes, the regiment has reason to be proud. However, despite the successes, the principal attention in the unit is still focused on shortcomings and unused reserves. I recall, in connection with this, a ceremonial meeting held here on the eve of the anniversary of Great October, in which Army Gen D. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, and Army Gen A. Lizichev, chief of the main political directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, took part. In conversations with the leaders of the Armed Forces, officers, warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers stated frankly what is slowing restructuring in the unit, and

what is interfering with their working in the new way, and achieving more tangible results in strengthening combat readiness and discipline and enhancing the quality of military and political training.

The same open, self-critical approach to the urgent problems of personnel training and indoctrination has also been taken in the tank regiment commanded by Lt Col A. Grigorash. He allows the collective to determine precisely and in a timely manner weak points in military training, and areas where the greatest efforts are required, and where right now the success of ensuring high combat readiness is being decided.

Here is but one example. Good material living conditions have been created for the soldiers, both in this unit and in the Regiment imeni Leninskiy Komsomol. Recently new, modern barracks, a bath, and an everyday services combine have been built to replace the old ones. A high quality sports complex, and beautifully designed tea room are welcome sights. Everything that has been done undoubtedly can be credited to the regimental aktiv, and especially the rear services specialists, who have made and are making great efforts to solve to the maximum possible extent the increased needs and requests of the men.

However, when an attempt was made in the unit to assess what had been achieved from the standpoint of the requirements of modern combat, it became clear that for some time questions of field training of rear services soldiers, and the development of those rear facilities that determine directly the level of combat readiness of the subunits, had fallen from view.

The regiment command, having analyzed the mistakes that were uncovered, took energetic steps to eliminate the shortcomings. First of all, they saw to the intensification of the training of rear services specialists. Having placed under rigid control the quality of its organization, the unit headquarters achieved highly effective exercises and drills, especially those carried out under field conditions.

All of this, it goes without saying, had a prompt affect on the results of military and political training, and in the final analysis on the combat readiness of the regiment. Concluding exercises that took place at the end of the year confirmed that the unit rear services were capable of carrying out effectively all measures associated with the all-round support of the tankers, both during the period of preparation, and in the course of combat operations.

Today all soldiers, including rear services specialists, face the task of checking their own activity against the high standards of combat readiness and modern combat. But, frankly speaking, in many places it is still not being accomplished consistently and with the required sense of responsibility. Numerous reasons can be given for the low activeness, lack of enterprise, and negligence of some officials. But the main reason, in my view, is that in some

military collectives, as before, adherence to old, obsolete approaches predominates, under which flourished deception, and an effort to pass off that which is desired as real and to cover up unsolved problems with outward displays of well-being.

As a matter of fact, as I visited the district garrisons, which are located in various climatic and geographic zones a great distance from one another, I frequently observed an identical picture. Outwardly the military encampment is a model of well-being: modern barracks, a new dining hall, excellently equipped warehouses, and warm cubicles for storing equipment. I recognize that in the past this was enough for the large unit or unit to be counted among the leaders in matters of rear services support.

Today, when the criteria and approaches have changed, and the state of affairs has begun to be assessed more strictly and objectively, behind the outward luster serious shortcomings are often revealed, which reflect in one way or another on combat readiness.

I confronted such facts in the garrison where officers A. Obukhov and V. Tarasenko serve. Judging from their reports, here much is being done to maintain vehicles and mechanisms in good condition, ensure reliable storage of materiel, and organize the training of rear services soldiers at a high methodological level, without indulgences or oversimplification. And truly, at a hasty glance it may seem that the combat readiness of rear services in the garrison is on a high level.

However, it immediately became clear from attempting to assess its condition according to the strict criteria of combat, that the rear services leaders had, for a considerable period of time, to put it mildly, thrown dust in the eyes of their higher up comrades. Only this and nothing else can explain the fact that during the inspection, in working out actions pertaining to a practice alert, the rear services subunits were unable to organize support of the soldiers on time and at a high level of quality. Analysis showed that, due to gaps in training and inadequacies in firm practical skills, rear services specialists could not load supplies on transport in a timely manner and transport them to the assigned area. In addition, the equipment seriously let them down. For example, when it was necessary to prepare hot food in the field for the men, to the embarrassment of all, some trailer kitchens turned out to be inoperable.

I would also like to say that, for some reason, the condition of technical resources often falls out of the sphere of attention of rear services officials. Apparently, here as well the usual stereotype is operable: We don't go on exercises everyday, they say, so its all right to postpone taking care of the equipment.

The harmfulness and insolvency of such conclusions are obvious. At one of the tactical exercises, which took place under the harsh conditions of the Polar Region, a motorized rifle regiment received the mission of carrying

out a long distance march, and, upon reaching the indicated line, preparing in a limited period of time to conduct a defensive battle. Throughout the training year the men in the combat subunits paid much attention to march training, engineer preparation of the terrain, organization of coordination, and to other questions, on the competent solving of which depended the success of the motorized rifle troops. Therefore, many in the regiment were sure that the unit would accomplish its assigned mission without any particular problems.

However, everything turned out otherwise. The march had just started when the headquarters already began to receive reports about lagging supply vehicles. First one, then another truck had engine or transmission troubles. When the regiment turned off the highway and went off-road, the entire rear services column also reduced its speed. It turned out that many motor vehicles were not equipped with means of cross-country movement.

Meanwhile, the combat subunits, not reducing speed, separated farther and farther from the rear services. However, when it was necessary to refuel, and obtain drinking water and hot food, they also had to halt for a long period of time awaiting vehicles with supplies. It is not difficult to imagine to what this delay could have led in a real battle. And officers G. Sklyaruk, M. Provalov, and other unit rear services specialists knew perfectly well the possible consequences of their irresponsibility in preparing the equipment for the march, but did nothing to prevent the essentially planned interruption.

Needless to say, we cannot reconcile ourselves to such an attitude toward work. But the question arises: How can we achieve a turning point in people's psychology, and rid them of the focus on outward effect and show what have been developed for years? It seems to me that first it is necessary to increase demandingness and be stricter toward those who replace true concern for strengthening combat readiness with imitation hustle and bustle, and with passive contemplation of the processes taking place in the military collective.

Recently the district command and military soviet have been implementing precisely this policy. The style of activity of leaders who commit serious omissions in the training and indoctrination of their subordinates, and in strengthening discipline and combat readiness, is everywhere receiving a principled and strict assessment. Today it is like this: If an officer correctly understands the demands of the times, and is energetic and initiative-filled, but he does not get something, or he makes a mistake in something, he must be helped. It is necessary to support initiative. But, if an officer is incapable of fundamentally improving the state of affairs in the collective entrusted to him, he must yield his place to a more competent and energetic leader.

During the past training year, I recall, Lt Col A. Kurapkin was the subject of many complaints. The military and political training in the rear services unit he led was

in a state of neglect, and insufficient attention was paid to the prescribed organization of the ordinary duty activities and everyday life of the soldiers. A routine inspection disclosed that the men were not prepared to accomplish military training tasks. His errors were strictly pointed out to Lt Col A. Kurapkin, and he was told how to eliminate them. However, he did not draw the correct conclusions. A second inspection again revealed serious deficiencies in ensuring the combat readiness of the unit. And it is no accident that now the question of removing the officer from his position is being decided.

However, it is of course very important not to forget about assisting leaders, and disseminating among them leading experience in training and indoctrinating the men, maintaining and servicing equipment, and storing materiel. I will be frank: Field training of the soldiers is still not being organized effectively enough in many rear services units and subunits. And after all, as we know, this is a most important component of combat readiness.

In order to remove this problem from the ranks of chronic difficulties, the district rear services command is now actively introducing such a progressive form of training as the comprehensive specialized tactical exercise, for which various types of subunits and services are brought in for joint actions. Here they receive an excellent opportunity, in an environment as close as possible to that of combat, to really work out various problems, concluding little-studied ones, associated with supporting the forces under conditions of maneuver actions, use of high precision weapons by the probable enemy, etc.

A recent exercise can serve as an example of a thoughtful, I would say innovative, approach to the organization of such types of measures. All rear services organs, beginning with the district supply depots and establishments, and ending with the individual material support battalion, assimilated the methods of delivering materiel using container shipments.

From the results of the exercise, recommendations were later prepared on improving the structure of the table of organization and the technical equipping of supply subunits, as well as on coordinating various rear services elements under conditions of modern combat. Their implementation, undoubtedly, will make it possible to improve the effectiveness of container shipments, and in the final analysis will help in strengthening the combat readiness of the rear.

The problem of developing and improving the rear services material base remains no less serious than that of field training in the military district. The ability of material support subunits to transport and deliver supplies to the troops in a combat situation in a limited period of time depends largely on the extent to which the condition of that base meets the increased requirements.

It must be noted that recently positive changes have been seen in this area in large units and units of the district. It

is especially gratifying to emphasize that tactical-level rear services leaders, without waiting for instructions from above, are themselves energetically seeking out internal reserves, and bringing them into action.

In connection with this, I would like to note lieutenant colonels V. Vlasov and V. Kutuzov, who are distinguished by their initiative, resourcefulness, and ability to bring what they begin to a conclusion. The units where these officers are serving were distinguished even previously by good rear services material base. But with their arrival a more energetic modernization policy was taken. In a relatively short period of time new supply rooms and cubicles were built and existing ones renovated. As a result, equipment and supply storage conditions improved, and the speed of loading materiel onto transport was significantly increased.

It is noteworthy in my view, first of all, that many of the things mentioned have been done here through their own efforts. Aply using the possibilities of the economic method, both officers are actively working for combat readiness. The same kind of aggressive position in his daily activity is also characteristic of Col I. Shinger. I have often visited the unit where this officer is serving. Each time I noticed striking changes were noticed that resulted from creative inquiry, and tireless thinking about rationalizing the work process.

If only all the district rear services specialists were tuned to that wavelength! Unfortunately, many of them are still seriously in need of waking up. For example, officers V. Taraman and N. Kudryavtsev simply are not able to give up the position of bystander. In the units where they are serving the construction of rear services facilities has dragged out unforgivably long, the deadlines for placing them in operation are constantly being broken, and a miserly amount of money allocated for construction is being used. In this situation they should redouble their efforts, and direct them toward seeking out unused reserves, but V. Taraman and N. Kudryavtsev are waiting for someone to come from higher headquarters and establish order in the military economy.

Undoubtedly it is necessary to assist officers serving at the tactical level. Representatives of district administrations and services who visit the troop units have precisely this goal. But we also cannot get along without initiative from below, especially now when a broad field of activity is opening up for it.

In the training year just begun, district forces, including rear services, are expected to reach new goals in improving military and political training, and to solve the most important tasks of improving combat readiness, and strengthening discipline and self-discipline. He who is able to restructure himself in the spirit of the times, rid himself of stereotype and inertia, and distinguish the main element in his work, will be best able to achieve high end results.

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Discussion of Mig-29: Specifications, Farnborough Appearance, Sales Abroad
18010127 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Oct 88 p 6

[Article by A. Gorokhov: "'Bell' in the British Sky"]

[Excerpt] Moderator: After *Pravda* reported the upcoming flight of the MIG-29 at the exhibition in Farnborough, Engineer A. Stronko from Tyumen Oblast, retiree V. Voloshiy from Moscow, and other readers reproached us that we continue to keep secrets from Soviet people interested in aviation, and fail to report the most important things—the technical specifications.

Technical Specifications of the MIG-29:

Normal takeoff weight	15 tons.
Maximum takeoff weight	18 tons.
Powerplant	Two RD-33 engines.
Maximum Mach number	2.3
Practical ceiling	17,000 meters.
Maximum G Force	9.(tab)
Maximum rate of climb at ground level	330 m/sec.
Length of takeoff roll	240 m.
Length of landing roll	600 m.
Maximum range	around 2,100 km.
Armament: 6 air-to-air missiles; 30 mm cannon; aerial bombs and air-to-ground missiles.	

Moderator: "Here is another letter to *Pravda*, from comrade A. Pylnev in Voronezh: "What is going on? Are we now showing military aircraft and their designs to capitalists? What are we doing, what sort of laxity is this? We might as well remove the control system from our military plants then, throw open the exits, and let the snoopers and others in to look at our military equipment, so later on they can strangle us!"

V. Maksimovskiy: "Well, of course no one intends to open the gates of our defense plants. But I won't deny it: there were a lot of arguments surrounding the MIG-29. Was it worth exhibiting? Would it arouse interest? I believe the correct decision was made. Without showing combat aviation equipment, you can't convince anyone of the technical level achieved by our country."

A. Vozov, Colonel, Military Pilot First Class, Moscow Military District: "You understand, I was not at the exhibition. But a unit in which I once served was one of the first to become type-rated in the MIG-29. I tell you honestly, opinions also varied among the military pilots. But the majority of those with whom I happened to exchange opinions responded positively to the decision to demonstrate the MIG-29. I believe that we lose a lot by not displaying our power and combat capabilities. And what is more, the show permits one to compare graphically, to find the weak points, i.e., to work at upgrading the equipment."

V. Menitskiy: "We were told that previously at analogous exhibitions it was hard for Soviet specialists even to make contact with the representatives of other companies. Things were different at Farnborough. There was a crowd of people around the aircraft from morning to evening, an enormous number of specialists visited us in the 'chalet,' and in turn Soviet participants were constantly being invited, and at times convenient to us, by all the leading companies."

M. Valdenberg, Aircraft Designer: "Fighter aviation synthesizes in itself, so to speak, the most progressive views of aviation science and technology. I see it thus: first of all we needed to show the western public the attainments of national science and technology. Especially since there had been an evident misunderstanding of the matter before the exhibition. There they always believed that we were trailing along at the back, spying out something of theirs, then copying it, and so forth. But now everyone realized that this does not correspond to the truth."

[Passage omitted]

[Excerpt] Moderator: "Since we've switched to the financial aspect, I will cite another letter from a *Pravda* reader. Comrade A. Solomin from Kiev, in particular writes: "Does the participation of the MIG-29 in this air show not indicate the desire to earn currency by any means? Does it not mean that now we will sell this aircraft to all comers (after all, isn't that why the fairs exist)? But what guarantee is there that the weapons will not be sold to a potential aggressor? *Pravda* should have given a political assessment of the upcoming event. But there was none. Why?"

V. Maksimovskiy: "The MIG-29 is already being sold. But the reader is correct in the sense that we are not indifferent to the question of into whose hands it may fall, and the purpose to which it may be put."

V. Menitskiy: "I think that in the question of sale, the manufacturing branch should have greater independence."

M. Valdenberg: "Let us discuss this. The OKB [design bureau] has certain tasks associated in particular with the use of our aircraft in other countries. This means a material interest in the broad sense of the word. The country receives some profit from the sale of aircraft. The OKB has no direct deductions from this profit. I don't have the precise figures, but even our ministry receives a meagre percentage of the deductions. But this is quite wrong! For he who does the work should also receive the corresponding valuation. First of all. Understand me correctly: I am not talking of any personal gain, if you will. I am speaking of the company, of its development and its problems. It is a paradox: export receipts come from the activity of certain firms and are distributed on the principle of "to all links in the chain." Forgive me, this is elementary wage-levelling."

Moderator: "There was just a report that on the very first work day of the exhibition, *British Aerospace* apparently reached an agreement on the sale of 19 passenger aircraft, and announced that the agreement was for some 260 million pounds sterling..."

"M. Valdenberg: "Maksimovskiy is absolutely right when he says that we must monitor the matter to ensure that our fearful weapons fall into honest hands. This is beyond all doubt. But for the time being we do not have commercial efficiency, obviously not only in the aviation field. And we lose everywhere because of this." [Passage omitted]

Bribery At Air Defense Forces Test Facility

18010129a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Oct 88 p 2

[Article by Captain E. Chemerskiy, correspondent for the major Air Defense Newspaper PATRIOT RODINY: "What Is Worrisome About Gifts for the Inspector"]

[Text] Dear Editor: I am a correspondent for the major newspaper PATRIOT RODINY. In August 1988 I was posted to a tactical exercise that included live firing at a range. I had previously not only heard from fellow soldiers, but had also personally run into the dishonorable attitudes that range officers (so-called permanent party) had towards those who came to fire. And once again I am convinced.

I often met with the soldiers from this unit at the range. I saw the suffering they put into preparing to carry out their firing and how they worked both at their positions and at the tent city. It seemed that this was the surest way to an excellent mark. But it turned out that their mark depended on more than just the skill and suffering of the launcher crew men.

Deputy Battalion Commander for Political Affairs Captain O. Khmylov told me that one of the range instructors (unfortunately he had forgotten his last name because he had not immediately written it down) who gave exams arrived at the classroom with an attache case. After suggesting to the subunit commander that it was empty and that it had to be filled in order to successfully pass, he left. When he returned he was satisfied with the fact that the case was a little heavier and he was in a good mood because of how matters had gone.

It is certainly unreasonable to equate all the other range officers with this one. There are many range officers who are honest and decent. But this example confirms that the people who are using their service position for personal gain have not been transferred.

I cannot excuse those who cater to extortionists, but put yourself in the place of a subunit commander. He shows that he adheres to his principles and begins, as the saying goes, to "look for truth" and that same instructor will do

everything to make sure that he finds "faults" in the soldiers' training. In short, you have insured that you do not get a subjective evaluation from the instructor or range chief.

Unfortunately, the fate of getting an undeserved "two" threatens not only the individual officers who are unmanageable. As a rule, they represent the collectives. Entire subunits are involuntarily in the vicious circle of gifts and favors. Foreseeing this, some launcher crew members stock up on items that are in short supply—alcohol and so forth—and take it with them. And all of this in order to please the range princelings.

Previous to this trip I had to go out to the range as deputy air defense missile battalion commander for political affairs. I remember how a commander once told me, "Look, Eduard Fedorovich, the zampolit [deputy commander for political affairs] is in a whirl in the adjacent unit, the inspectors are satisfied with him, he is a good political worker." He and I well understood what "in a whirl" meant. This in no way meant that he was at the positions from morning to night working with personnel. On the contrary, since he is the man most free from military work, the zampolit must be involved in pleasing the inspectors—heating rations for them, pouring out drinks and treating them. I personally have not been able to cope with this task: I could not overcome the feeling of hostility toward such people and toward the very procedure of gifts that reduce human worth. And I could not submit to the fact that labor is not judged by diligence and honest results.

I stress that these facts are isolated. The fresh wind of perestroika is doing a lot to heal the climate at the ranges. And yet it is still too soon to say that everything is totally all right. It is difficult to eliminate the total permissiveness that began during those years of stagnation as well as the negative traditions that developed during those times. Just as with an illness that has been extremely worn down, there can be relapses. That is why I decided to talk about this difficult problem in the Central Military Newspaper.

1st Deputy CINC, PVO on Disruption of Training by Inspection Commissions

18010249 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Sep 88 Second Edition pp 1-2

[Interview by Maj A. Dokuchayev, KRASNAYA Correspondent, with Col Gen V. Litvinov, first deputy commander in chief of PVO Troops: "The Times and Style of Work. On Temporary Duty With the Troops. . ."]

[Text] "It is very difficult to work because of the frequent commissions," officers of the fighting forces write frequently. Thus, during 8 months of the current year, 73 commissions visited the surface-to-air missile unit in which Lt Col V. Alekseyev serves, and 67 visited another one. Officers in the directorate of combat training and the political directorate of the PVO Troops [Air Defense

Forces] are continually traveling. But what is the return? At times, simply those shortcomings are recorded that are generally known in the units. What has to be done in order to change the existing situation so that assistance to commanders, political workers and combat engineers is effective? These are the questions that began an interview by Maj A. Dokuchayev, our correspondent, with Col Gen V. Litvinov, first deputy commander in chief of PVO Troops.

[Litvinov] We know cases when officers of the central staff [tsentralnyy apparat] who come to units concentrate on a search for all kinds of errors. It happens that they also arrange to reprimand officers. What is called replacement of officials on the spot also occurs at times. But these are special cases. We react to them, and they are becoming fewer and fewer. I could cite dozens of other examples when our officers promote the development of greater independence of commanders and affirm them to be experts in their own field.

This year, for example, we were disturbed by the low professional skill of rocketeers [raketchnik] of the large unit [soyedineniye] in which Lt Col F. Zakiyev serves, and by the state of the commander's training of officers, warrant officers and sergeants. Col G. Dobrov was sent there to work. His wealth of experience and competence enabled him to disclose the following. Indeed, the officers were expending a lot of energy, and training sessions were held no less frequently than in other collectives, but they were conducted without aiming at an end result, in the old way. Col Dobrov proposed to prepare and conduct a series of training session demonstrations. He himself organized a missile infantry drill [raketno-strelkovaya trenirovka] with teams of the battalion's [divizion] command post. With his participation, methodological novelties were also worked up which originated in the rocketeer collective. Training time was condensed, and the skills of soldiers in conducting anti-air battle were strengthened.

Also working with productive results are Cols O. Ivanov, G. Vinnikov, V. Kolesnikov, R. Rusakov, and V. Ivlev. Now, any other way is simply impermissible. Last year we were confronted by the necessity to increase sharply the demands on officers of the central staff for productive work results in the combat units [v voyskakh]. The main attention was on a thorough and comprehensive study of the state of affairs in the units, the provision of positive assistance to commanders and staffs in a qualitative resolution of existing tasks. The question stands like this—to work at the limit of the possible and to eliminate revealed shortcomings on the spot, with the exception, perhaps, of those defects that require protracted study. But here also—not to take a passive position, to establish periods and specific executors, and to take an active part in the matter.

[Dokuchayev] Officers of the main staff and directorates go to combat units to work, and not only to inspect. But as letters to the editor indicate, members arriving at

units are called inspectors [proveryayushchiy], as formerly. It seems that there has been no change in their investigative [revizorskiye] functions?

[Litvinov] The purposes for sending officers to combat units are quite varied. Also, verification [kontrol] has not been removed from the agenda, and it is becoming stricter, and the evaluations are becoming more objective. Therefore, also, the trips are purposeful—to verify, let us say, a unit's combat readiness. Recently, for example, it was revealed that the unit in which Col Ye. Novinskiy serves scarcely employed controlled low-flying targets. This is a serious shortcoming. At present, to determine the real level of readiness of units and subunits to execute tasks assigned without prior notice, there is a widespread practice of moving them to training grounds to conduct tactical exercises with live fire.

Of course, we are not indifferent to what the officers of the glavkomat [possibly higher headquarters staff] are called in combat units. And if someone asserts only the reputation of the inspector, then we immediately sound the alarm, and we set our sights on those who show themselves in combat units to be organizers of training and service. And there are officers such as I have already noted. Here is another feature. In the radiotechnical unit in which Lt Col A. Popov serves, the automated system crew was practically not ready to accomplish tasks assigned to it. In addition, there was no reliable communication between the radar command post and the surface-to-air missile unit. Lt Col I. Kolodenko, an officer of the directorate of RTV [Radiotechnical Troops] took measures to search for the necessary communications channel. And his colleagues, Lt Col V. Sinitsyn and Maj B. Gutsalyuk, organized the training of specialists for ASU [probably automated command, control and communications] crews. The combat capability of the units increased.

[Dokuchayev] An impression is formed that officers of the glavkomat replace commanders of units [chast] and large units [soyedineniye]?

not to go to extremes, and not to dismiss an official for deficiencies committed though his fault. In the first place, this undermines people's independence, and, secondly, dependency relationships are engendered. It reached the point that some commanders only reported about problems, and they "set tasks" before higher authorities for weapons repair, putting simulators into operation, etc., instead of finding their own possible resolution on the spot.

[Dokuchayev] On the day before this interview, I interested myself in the hours of work of some staff workers in combat units. Thus, two of those that you mentioned were on temporary duty assignments this year for more than 100 days, and Col V. Ivlev, for 131 days. Do they have the opportunity for improving their own training

and for developing ideas that sprang up during their work in the units and at command posts? Because it is impossible to teach others if one does not himself have any time left for training.

[Litvinov] Most of our trips to combat units are planned. Unfortunately, it is not possible to avoid urgent temporary duty. . . Of course, it is necessary to have a well-thought-out schedule, taking into account tasks to be resolved. What should it be like? For the time being, it is difficult for us to answer.

We proceeded from the fact that temporary duty assignments with the troops are meetings with various categories of specialists, an exchange of ideas, frank discussion and telling the truth to one's face. This provides good food for thought, and it prompts rational ways of resolving pressing problems. You will not see them from an office window.

It is becoming more difficult every day to train KP [command post] crews in the practical operation of combat equipment. More complicated weapons models are appearing, and the number of specialties in a unit is increasing. Clearly, the ability of any person is not unlimited. Nevertheless, each officer of the central staff, as a rule, knows two or three models to perfection. And individual staff workers are beginning to become proficient in antiair and radar systems in design bureaus and plants of manufacturers before they go into series production.

[Dokuchayev] These are individual staff workers. But how do the rest of the officers become proficient in new weapons?

[Litvinov] With the appearance of the first models, they are retrained in accordance with the plans of the chiefs of combat arms, guidance in courses and in the system of commander training with a visit to training centers. Here they acquire competence, without which it is impossible to write up documents on the combat employment of equipment, and its mastery, maintenance and operation. For example, Cols V. Nagornyy and V. Ivlev became proficient in modern fighters. Now they are transferring this experience to airmen of fighter air regiments. That is the way it is in other departments of the combat arms as well.

Of course, there are also officers who cannot effectively influence the betterment of the situation in combat units, including proficiency in new equipment. Therefore, we take leave of those who do not meet the requirements of the times. We also have to take extreme steps as, for example, with Col B. Panayev. He was released into the reserve.

[Dokuchayev] Comrade Colonel General, the staff structure is being changed now in connection with the reduction in staff [apparat]. Much here depends on the competence of glavkomat officers who are studying the state

of affairs on the spot and who are making recommendations on this score. But KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is receiving letters which report that a lot is being done in a hasty way. For example, Col I. Sabelin writes that the staff of one of the services of a large unit [soyedineniye] was cut in half while the volume of tasks to be resolved remains the same. But on the other hand, a new element is being introduced into the staff of the directorate. Decisions like this exasperate people.

[Litvinov] But why should these decisions be greeted immediately, as the saying goes, with open arms? Not everyone on the central staff accepted these decisions at first either. The ranks in our directorates were depleted, but the tasks and requirements increased. We had to restructure ourselves. We began to engage in less paper-shuffling and to plan our activity more rationally. And the time for work with people became available. We got into a proper rhythm.

It is difficult to give a simple answer to Colonel Zabelin's question concerning changes in the staff structure. Only time will permit us to determine whether the adopted decision is correct. But all of us must learn how to execute assigned tasks in a qualitative way.

[Dokuchayev] Do the representatives of the central staff work with the soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers and the junior officers during their trips to combat units? In particular, what is being done to strengthen discipline and to eliminate "dedovshchina?"

[Litvinov] We have begun to work more to the point [predmetneye] with letters of servicemen and their parents locally. We are paying the most serious attention to the fight against "dedovshchina." The main thing here, in our view is to fortify trust between chiefs and their subordinates, and to organize combat training in such a way that real comradely relationships are established while it is going on. It is true that not everything is turning out for the time being, but we do not intend to stop halfway.

[Dokuchayev] Generals from the main staff frequently make trips to work in combat units. I had occasion to hear the opinion that the arrivals of some of them disorganized combat training in units. The units declare crash work [avral], and the installation and documentation are urgently put into shape. At times, some are stricken with fear. They think that they might lose their jobs.

[Litvinov] At present, the work of officers and generals in units, aside from no-notice inspections [vnezapnaya proverka] of combat capability, are carried out, as a rule, without disrupting planned combat and political training. And there is simply no basis to speak about its disorganization. Moreover, during exercises and training sessions we strive to rule out calls "downward" and summons of subordinates by senior chiefs, which disrupts the work routine of subordinates.

With respect to crash work [avral]. Are they really planned by the glavkomat? Recently, a group of our officers worked in the "Nth" large unit [soyedineniye]. Turmoil really occurred there before their arrival. They tried in the course of a week to make an assault on problems that had piled up for a half year. If the commander of the large unit had painstakingly and punctually organized the everyday life of the soldiers in accordance with the requirements of guidance documents and the requirements of combined arms regulations, then, after learning about the forthcoming arrival of the glavkomat commission, he would not have to announce the usual crash work. Strict inquiries had to be made about this neglect. Fear and uncertainty are a consequence of the incompetence of officials, inability, and at times a reluctance to organize work clearly and skillfully.

Now about the fact that "one might have to say good-bye to his job." Yes, one might have to leave, if an officer was entrusted with a high position, but did not justify this trust. As, for example, Col D. Zavadskiy, the chief of aviation of one of the large units [soyedineniye]. He could not cope with his duties, and he violated discipline, and it was precisely during the work of the glavkomat commission. He had to be removed from the position he held. Of course, this was not because of a whim of the general who came to the large unit.

There are considerably more examples where, according to the work of officers of the central staff, progressive-minded commanders and political workers are rewarded. Thus, for the high results displayed by a subunit collective in an unannounced inspection with a trip to the training ground for live firing, its commander, Capt V. Yevdokimov, by order of the commander in chief of the PVO Troops, was registered as a candidate for enrollment in a military academy. And Capt S. Lemeshev and Sr Lt Yu. Kushnarenko were awarded a valuable prize by this same order.

I am not lying when I say that many of the officers and generals of the glavkomat, along with being very exacting and strict in their inquiries into assigned tasks, are also distinguished by a sense of tact and a respectful attitude toward people. Nevertheless, questions about improving the style of activity of managerial workers are raised sharply at party meetings and conferences. What is more, we are committed to extremely complex tasks that confront the Air Defense Troops, and for whose resolution the central staff has been assigned an important role.

District Air Force Staffs Slow to Adopt Computers
18010236a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Sep 88 Second Edition p 1

[Article by Major A. Yudin, Military Navigator 1st Class, Baltic Military District: "Computer or Pencil—What is Hindering the Acceleration of Military Training"]

[Text] Dissatisfied with the level of the flight missions that he was flying, Deputy Squadron Commander Major

A. Tokarenko once turned to District Air Force Staff officer Colonel K. Chesnochenko and said that he was fed up with following the well-trodden path and really wanted to try his skills at something more difficult. The latter carefully listened to the major and when the squadron was preparing for its next LTU (tactical flight exercise) he recommended missions of increased difficulty especially for Major Tokarenko. The officer used computer technology to calculate the required amount of ordnance, the route and the types of maneuvering and he foresaw all of the methods that would guarantee the highest probability for breaking through to the target and the optimum variations for closing with it. The attack on the assigned objective was swift and precise.

The district Air Force commander gave Major Tokarenko a bonus for the skill that he displayed at the exercise. But Tokarenko had already gone further. He and Deputy Squadron Commander Major V. Derevyanko continued to look for ways to make effective air attacks against various types of ground targets. Again using computers, they sorted through and calculated a number of battle variations and determined the possibilities for inflicting maximum fire effect on a target in a minimum amount of time over it. They verified their calculations during exercises at the next squadron LTU.

The results? They gained some very positive experience. And how was it put into practice?

I am interested in the adjacent squadron and how it was informed about Major Tokarenko's successful experiments. People there do not even know what he is specifically involved in. They themselves have not worked on similar problems and are still flying in the old manner. Many unfounded restrictions are still in effect. For example, pilots have to be able to make bombing runs in flight formation, but the commander allowed them to make runs only in pairs. Attacks are not swift enough and approaches are made with utmost care.

In short, despite the successes that we have had, our new methodology is simply not forcing its way through. There are various reasons for this. For example aviators headed by Captain V. Danilenko recently began an interesting experiment. They decided to use a computer to model aerial battle. They developed programs to translate reference coordinates from one reference system to another and prepare initial data to be loaded into on-board equipment and many other things. They now have to develop equipment to read out reference coordinates. But navigator A. Guryev complains that the work is hopelessly spinning its wheels because it appears that no one is interested in the experiment.

Even now pilots in other squadrons are tracing their entire flight plan on graph paper and then transferring it to big maps. This is cumbersome and does not allow them to totally consider the formulae for flight trajectory, maneuver and combat application. Here is a comparison that says it all. It takes at least 30 minutes to

trace a curve maneuver on graph paper using the contemporary graphic analysis method. These same operations take six or seven minutes on a computer and three or four of those minutes are used to load the program. And this time can be reduced as we acquire experience.

I have to say that the District Air Force Headquarters has recently recognized that we are moving rather slowly in introducing small computers, micro-calculators and displays to improve tactics. It has also become clear that some pilots have poor skills in using them. Therefore the decision was made to hold additional exercises. Representatives from one of the scientific research institutes recently visited our aviators and scientists helped the aerial soldiers master computer equipment.

But is this enough? How do pilots manage without personal (individual) exercises on information retrieval? Why do we not hold exercises where each pilot can

report about a subject that he has learned, but that his comrades still know little about? Because aviators seldom train with electronic equipment. And there is no individual work being planned for them on this subject. There is good reason for the fact that many pilots cannot go further and begin modeling the elements of flight which, when combined, make up the entire battle model.

It is precisely this path that Major Tokarenko's subordinates took to success. But, knowing about the problems in other subunits, it is still too early to show optimism. We have to seriously think about why we are still "attacking on tiptoes." It is time to more extensively bring into the inventory all of the advanced experience that we have, experience which, alas, people even in the adjacent squadrons of the same regiment still do not know about.

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Chief of Chemical Troops Interviewed

18010143 Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in
Russian No 19, 26 Sep 88 pp 30-31

[Interview with Col Gen V. K. Pikalov, Chief of Chemical Troops, under rubric "Interview at Our Request": "Porton-Down and Shikhany"]

[Text] In May of this year, a Soviet delegation became acquainted with Great Britain's center for chemical defense at Porton-Down near Salisbury. On a 29 June to 4 July 1988 return visit, a delegation of Great Britain got acquainted with the Soviet military facility of Shikhany. The editorial office received quite a few questions from readers concerning these events. Col Gen V. K. Pikalov, chief of chemical troops of the USSR Ministry of Defense, replies to some of them.

[Question] What main questions were resolved in the course of work of the Soviet and British experts on chemical weapons at the Shikhany military facility?

[Pikalov] Progress along the path of developing a convention on banning chemical weapons has two aspects: a political one and a technical one. The main feature of a political resolution of the problem, undoubtedly, is the achievement of mutual trust. It is for this purpose that the gates of military installations and training grounds are being opened. The technical aspect is first and foremost monitoring the fulfillment of state obligations to observe the provisions of the convention. The system of international monitoring includes systematic verifications by request.

Verifications are implemented by means of periodic on-site inspections and continuous surveillance with the help of technical devices. They will be conducted at enterprises and installations that are announced officially after the convention goes into effect.

An inquiry will be conducted in the event that any state suspects that another party is violating the convention. Inspectors will be given the opportunity to visit the facility in question in no later than within 48 hours. This is an inspection by request.

[Question] What relations were established between our experts and the British experts during the joint work?

[Pikalov] According to the comments of our experts who worked in Porton-Down, relations on the part of the representatives of ministries and departments of Great Britain were benevolent. The meeting had a business-like character. Considering that the organization of the visit to the Porton-Down chemical center, as well as the Shikhany military facility afterwards, was an act of goodwill on the part of the USSR and Great Britain, the Soviet delegation did not make any additional demands. Nineteen reports with demonstrations of equipment and weapons models, whose main orientation was tied to

problems of monitoring and destruction of chemical weapons, were presented to the British delegation during the display in Shikhany. The representatives of Great Britain asked more than 300 questions, to which exhaustive answers were given by employees of the Shikhany military facility and Soviet experts.

[Question] Was any difference observed in the organization of work of specialists in Porton-Down and in Shikhany?

[Pikalov] The Soviet delegation accepted the proposed program in full, and it adhered strictly to the plan of work in Porton-Down. The British delegation, however, began its work with a requirement concerning a program change, proposing to move up a helicopter flight over the Shikhany facility by a day earlier. The Soviet side agreed with this proposal. During the overflight of the facility area, the delegation of Great Britain selected 10 points for an additional visit, and this opportunity was granted. One half hour before the designated time of takeoff from the facility, the British experts literally demanded to be allowed the opportunity to get acquainted with yet another, an eleventh, area in the facility. And this request was satisfied. For comparison, it is necessary to note that the Soviet delegation visited only one area of its own selection in Port-Down.

[Question] Did any unexpected situation arise during the British delegation's visit to the Shikhany facility?

[Pikalov] On the whole, the visit of the delegation of Great Britain to the Shikhany military facility was of a tough nature, as if it were an on-site inspection by request, and not an act of goodwill on our part.

The biggest surprise for us was the lack of interest of the British experts in discussing problem-solving questions worked up by the convention on banning chemical weapons. All of the attention of the British delegation was absorbed by the collection of data of an informational nature. A majority of the questions raised by the British were outside the limits of convention problems. An examination of the entire area of the military facility by the experts and the persistent and almost ultimatum-like demands to visit a facility in Saratovskaya Oblast that belongs to one of the industrial ministries, which was not planned for in the program, did not contribute to a resolution of the problems under discussion.

I repeat, the act of goodwill on the Soviet side in such a display of a military chemical facility to achieve a deeper mutual understanding and an acceleration of the process of chemical disarmament was viewed by the delegation of Great Britain from the position of a strict inspection by request without the right of refusal. But similar inspections will be possible only after the convention on the ban against chemical weapons is signed and goes into effect. It is quite understandable that the tendentious approach of the British experts bewildered us and gave rise to some disappointment.

Western Account of Tukhachevskiy Affair
18010142 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 18 Sep 88 p 4

[Article prepared by S. Kosterin in response to letter from G. Volozhanin of Moscow under rubric "Correspondence on Historical Topics": "The Tukhachevskiy 'Affair'"; first paragraph is Volozhanin letter]

[Text] *"Dear SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA editors! It is not by chance that in our days a heightened and persistent interest has arisen in events which preceded the beginning of the Great Patriotic War and in our Army's enormous losses during the distressing days of the retreat. Now in accordance with party resolutions there is an active process to wipe out the 'blank spaces' and new documents are being publicized shedding light on the true reasons for particular phenomena. I am interested in particular in the notorious 'affair' of Marshal Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevskiy and prominent Soviet military leaders. I had occasion to hear that there is a large amount of literature on this question and there are rather serious and persuasive studies in the West. Would you find it possible to familiarize readers with this work?"*

How could it happen that our best military cadres were annihilated on the eve of fascist aggression?

N. S. Khrushchev declared at the 22d party congress that through its intelligence service the leadership of Hitler Germany saw that fabricated document—"proof" of a plot headed by Marshal Tukhachevskiy and other prominent military leaders—as well as "information" about their collaboration with the Wehrmacht fell into Stalin's hands. Preparation of the dossier with "authentic" documents pursued the objective of playing on Stalin's negative qualities—his brutality, mistrustfulness and suspiciousness—and thus weakening the Red Army.

This "proof," supposedly secret documents, got into the hands of Czechoslovak President Benes, who sent them on to Stalin with good intentions.

Information about the "Tukhachevskiy affair" repeatedly appeared in the press during the 1950's and 1960's. Benes, Winston Churchill, and leading associates of fascist Germany's secret security service Wilhelm Hettl (Walter Hagen) and Walter Schellenberg mention this in their memoirs, but this subversion is not as simple as they present it.

Taking advantage of memoirs of state, political and military figures and the archives, West German historian J. Pfaff made a serious study and created a convincing version about how and by whom the "Tukhachevskiy affair" had been fabricated.

Today's article uses Pfaff's work and other documents presented to our editors by the VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL. They will be published in the next issues of this publication.

Who is the Author?

Much that was secret now has become clear, but in the prewar years both Nazis and imperialist figures were carefully concealing their true intentions. Fascism's objective was war and the enslavement of peoples of the Soviet Union. War against the USSR was maturing with imperialist nourishment in the bowels of fascist Germany. This naturally was carefully concealed but it was no secret for people who had dedicated themselves to military affairs. They included Marshal Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevskiy and an entire galaxy of Soviet military leaders who had been tempered in the crucibles of military ordeals of World War I and the Civil War. They were perspicaciously preparing our Army for future ordeals and as individuals they themselves represented a formidable force against fascism. It was against them that one of the most significant and alas successful provocations of German fascism was organized.

Pfaff writes in his study: "It appears certain that in approximately mid-December 1936 Heydrich briefed Hitler on his plan to set in motion false documents which were to 'confirm' the existence of imaginary ties between Tukhachevskiy and the German General Staff."

In their memoirs Hagen and Schellenberg assert that Hitler approved this plan. In early 1937 Schellenberg received an order to draw up a study about the history of relationships between the Red Army and the Reichswehr, and after this came Heydrich's instruction on preparing false documents.

But as a rule memoirs are written later on the heels of what has been experienced, when there is an opportunity to touch up one's position, whitewash one's involvement, or distort the course of events. Hagen and Schellenberg are no exception. According to their version Heydrich allegedly demanded from Admiral Canaris, the head of counterintelligence, proof of relations between the two armies of Germany and the USSR during the period 1926-1932, proof for developing the fake documents against Tukhachevskiy. Canaris allegedly refused.

Then in the exposition of Hagen and Schellenberg there follows a fantastic criminal story in the cowboy spirit of how in a night raid on the counterintelligence archives Heydrich with the help of SS detachments seized the documents which Canaris allegedly refused to submit.

One other version was concocted and put in circulation about the involvement of "Soviet specialists" in manufacturing the fake documents, that all this was inspired by the NKVD, and that Heydrich and his staff allegedly performed only an intermediary and auxiliary role.

"To the contrary," writes Pfaff, "the version according to which Heydrich's people allegedly entered into contact with the Soviet Embassy in Berlin in order to offer the Soviet Union 'material' against Tukhachevskiy by the direct route and that later Stalin's representative was

sent from Moscow to Berlin to redeem these documents from the Germans for three million gold rubles is completely precluded. It is equally fully proven both in Soviet and in Czechoslovak documents that Benes alone sent Stalin the planted 'documents,' having received them directly from the Reich, and that although an important intermediary role fell to Wittig (more about him later), he was not the sole source."

The West German historian exposes the thesis of the "Soviet origin" of the fake documents by pointing out the doubtfulness of the time periods and the path by which the false documents got to Moscow. In his opinion, the fact that the "SD dossier" fell into the hands of representatives of the Soviet Union only in mid-May 1937 does not stand up to criticism since otherwise Tikhachevskiy could not have been removed from his posts on 11 May.

Then just what were the channels over which this "SD dossier" passed?

Masters of Intrigues

One has to do them justice—the fascist fanatics were not only torturers, but also very refined provocateurs who were able to spin a web of intrigues from afar. Their gamble was well-conceived and very likely unerring. It was a gamble on Czechoslovakia, which they later would occupy literally without a single shot being fired.

By that time Czechoslovakia and the USSR already had been linked for two years by a mutual assistance treaty. It was natural that Czechoslovakia, which both the fascist rulers and rulers of western countries viewed as a card in their big game, was ruled also by representatives of the bourgeoisie, particularly President Benes. Taking the interests of his country sincerely to heart, he carefully (any other way was impossible) followed the slightest changes in European politics, first a rapprochement, then a divergence in relations among countries, forecasting how all this would affect Czechoslovakia's destiny. Relations of the USSR and Germany were subjected to an especially careful analysis: the treaty with the USSR, the threat of aggression on the part of Germany. Ally and enemy. Czechoslovakia's diplomatic service was interested even in the most trivial details.

Was not the calculation of the fascist falsifiers built on this?

And so as early as April 1936 Czechoslovakia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs "learned" on a confidential basis from white emigres living in Prague about allegedly existing plans of the Soviet Army leadership directed against Stalin, after whose overthrow the plotters intended to establish friendly relations with Berlin and renounce the Soviet Union's obligations under the mutual assistance treaty with Czechoslovakia.

And further, on 12 October Goering told the Polish deputy minister of foreign affairs that Tikhachevskiy

had stopped in Berlin on his return trip from London in February 1936 and tried to meet with Hitler and the Wehrmacht High Command. The clear calculation was that this disinformation would find a home in the intelligence circles of other countries.

In October the Prague police arrested Gestapo agents who were preparing to steal documents from the Soviet military attache in Prague. It is clear from a report of the presidium of the Prague police directorate to the presidium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that these agents asserted that the Soviet military attache allegedly was maintaining ties with German counterintelligence.

Pfaff writes that "not long before the 1936 Christmas holidays a report was delivered to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs from White Guard emigree Roman Smal-Stocki, a former Ukrainian envoy in Berlin who later lived in Warsaw, which justifiably forced Benes to fear a new Rapallo (as a result of news of the upcoming change of the German course with respect to the USSR). The report contained detailed information about a National Socialist plan to use subversive actions to cause a political coup in the Soviet Union with the wide involvement of Trotskyites as well as a number of ambitious high Red Army commanders even before conclusion of a treaty with Moscow."

Smal-Stocki's report contained the following information:

"Germany's chief task at the present time is to demoralize the USSR, cause an internal coup there, eliminate the communist government and place a national government in power which would conclude an alliance with Germany. Execution of the German plan will be prepared in the USSR by forces of the Gestapo, which are to involve not just Trotskyites in their action, but also other communist forces, especially in the army. The coup itself is to be accomplished by the Red Army."

"Catapult" Threat

But just what finally persuaded Czechoslovakia's diplomatic service and its President Benes nevertheless about the existence of a "military plot" and the threat of a rapprochement of the USSR and Germany?

Secret talks were held between Czechoslovakia and Germany in 1936, first in Prague and later in Berlin with Count Trautmannsdorf. Then Czechoslovak envoy Voitech Mastny hastily traveled from Berlin to Prague, but before that, on 9 February 1937, he informed Czechoslovak President Eduard Benes of the following in writing:

"Today I was visited by Count Trautmannsdorf and informed that a certain delay had occurred in talks regarding a treaty. The Reich Chancellor allegedly is very dissatisfied over the publication of Seba's book about Russia and the Little Entente, which makes it clear as to how considerably Czechoslovakia is tied with Russia."

(An explanatory digression must be made here. In the book "Russia and the Little Entente in World Politics" published in Prague in 1936 author Jan Seba, a Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest, expressed regret over the defeat of Soviet troops in the Polish-Soviet War of 1920, which led to the fact that the Soviet Union did not have a common border with Czechoslovakia. In his opinion, the presence of such a border would have considerably facilitated Soviet military assistance to Czechoslovakia through the eastern regions of Poland. For this reason the book caused a big, albeit sometimes feigned, scandal and in 1937 the author had to be recalled from his diplomatic post.)

V. Mastny went on:

"For this reason the Reich Chancellor intends to postpone further talks with Czechoslovakia for 10-14 days until the Seba affair is clarified. This should not mean that Hitler has changed his position on this question, but merely assumes that the present moment is not favorable for this. I said that I will hardly be able to understand how Seba's book, on the basis of which propaganda artificially fabricated things against us about which the book says nothing at all, could affect the Reich Chancellor to such an extent, especially as there were statements from our side in which the president of the Republic personally explained the nature of our political treaty with Russia. At the same time I added that we, however, are left with nothing other than to take the aforementioned into consideration. . . .

"I declared that finally after detailed talks with Goebels, Funk and Rosenberg I do not understand at all how this campaign can continue specifically in a period of talks when just one single instruction of the Reich Chancellor would have been sufficient to stop these things, and that we were not contemplating such a 'musical accompaniment' for our talks after the Chancellor's initiative to establish personal contact with the president of the Republic. In an extremely polite manner Count Trautmannsdorf acknowledged my reproaches and statements as correct. Above all, with respect to the delay which has occurred, he reported (and simultaneously requested that this information be kept secret) that the real reason for the Chancellor's decision to postpone the talks is his supposition, based on certain information which he received from Russia, that a surprise coup was possible there soon which was to lead to the removal of Stalin and Litvinov and establishment of a military dictatorship. If this should occur then the Reich Chancellor allegedly would change his position with respect to Russia and would be ready at the same time to resolve all problems connected with Western and Eastern Europe, of course again by concluding bilateral treaties.

"I gave Count Trautmannsdorf an analysis of the situation in Russia as it seems to us together with serious doubts that a turn toward a military dictatorship and

Stalin's removal would occur there. But at the same time I said that of course I do not know whether or not Prague has any kind of information of recent days, and if it does, then what kind."

Czechoslovak envoy Mastny submitted a detailed report about this very thing in Prague on 11 February to Minister of Foreign Affairs Krofta and President Benes, and on 13 February once again had a two-hour talk with the president.

It would appear that the Nazis continued to fool Mastny even further, strengthening his confidence as to the "validity" of "confidential" information received from Trautmannsdorf. The archives of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs have preserved the report of Czechoslovak envoy Voitech Mastny to Minister of Foreign Affairs Kamil Krofta of 20 March 1937. Here are the kinds of reflections he reported from Berlin to Prague:

"I am convinced that the sounding out of both emissaries was done on instruction of high Reich instances and pursued the objective of taking us out of a treaty system with Russia. I recall that back over a month ago I submitted a report according to which the Reich Chancellor allegedly had information about the possibility of a sudden and imminent coup in Russia and about the possibility of the removal of Stalin and Litvinov and establishment of a military dictatorship in Moscow, as a result of which there could occur a fundamental turn in German policy with respect to Russia; it is common knowledge that also with the present state of things there have been and still are sufficient sympathies in the German Army for this. As I know from a well informed source, Schacht also favors this; to an ever increasing extent he is experiencing a need to expand the scope of economic ties with Russia, which suffered heavily at the present stage as a result of Moscow's negative position. I was assured that right up until recently Hitler was rejecting Schacht's requests to achieve an improvement in economic ties with Russia as a result of some kind of changes in the position on political issues. But it is also known that Schulenburg, the German Ambassador in Moscow, recently was in Berlin and in connection with this it is assumed that the Reich Chancellor's new considerations regarding a change of all relations with Russia arose specifically also on the basis of information which Schulenburg carried from Moscow. Of course it is impossible to obtain more detailed information on this question, but it can be said with confidence that considerations relative to the possibility of any substantial turn in policy with respect to Russia also should have an effect in assessing the question of developing relations with Czechoslovakia and specifically the question of a possible treaty settlement of relations with us."

In his "Memoirs," published in Cologne in 1959, Walter Schellenberg just did not wish to raise the curtain even slightly over how the "SD dossier" got to President Benes. He contributed to wide dissemination of the

version about how Benes swallowed the bait of the fascist fake document and that it allegedly went along the line of Hitler-Heydrich-German agent in Prague-Benes. Benes himself writes in postwar memoirs that he learned about Tukhachevskiy's "conspiratorial plans" from a conversation between Mastny and Trautmannsdorf, one of two emissaries at the secret German-Czechoslovak talks. After the death of Benes Trautmannsdorf repudiated this fact "indignantly."

Who put the fabrication, possibly even after Mastny's report, in the hands of the Czechoslovak intelligence services? Recently it was learned that the aforementioned German journalist Wittig could be that "confidential person" of the German special services. His contacts with Benes were intensive. A document—a letter to him from the president—is known in which gratitude is expressed for "services."

Relatively recently it was established that Karl Wittig, an agent of Germany's security service, maintained ties with the intelligence service of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was activated for disinformation. Along the way he also helped keep intelligence of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs monitored by fascist Germany's intelligence services. Karl Wittig (1901-1980) was arrested in the GDR in 1961 as a double agent and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. In 1970 the FRG government ransomed him for 80,000 West German marks.

Thus the majority of analysts are of the opinion that it was Wittig who was the intermediary instance of the subversive fascist dossier, although Count Trautmannsdorf also played a key role in all this.

The "dossier" prepared by the Nazis about Tukhachevskiy's ties with the German General Staff and its progress was kept such a secret that not even Germany's highest officials knew about the subversion being prepared. On 29 January 1937 German Ambassador to the USSR Count Schellenberg, who was not privy to the intrigue, assessed the official Soviet accusation about ties with Berlin of the "Trotskyites" (Radek, Pyatakov and others) indicted in January as a controversial maneuver aimed at morally discrediting the anti-Stalin opposition in Soviet society's eyes. Literally a day before Trautmannsdorf "dropped" the information on Mastny, the German Ambassador condemned rumors about a plot in the Red Army High Command "as purely fictitious conclusions from previous trials." He reported that there were no signs of tension in relations between Stalin and Tukhachevskiy as well as other generals.

Even a month after the Trautmannsdorf-Mastny conversation the German War Ministry categorically declared on the basis of intelligence that neither Tukhachevskiy nor other Soviet generals were maintaining any ties with the Trotskyite opposition and were not thinking about a military plot against Stalin.

Moreover on 7 January 1938, already after what happened, von Toppelskirch, an adviser to the German Embassy in Moscow, reported the following to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin:

"As early as June 1937 after the execution of eight generals French Ambassador Coulondre asked Litvinov the question about how the charges of espionage for Germany against the generals should be assessed. Litvinov responded skillfully and evasively that it was the job of the court to give an assessment. He did not know the details, except those published in the court judgment, and it was hardly worthwhile to direct Coulondre's attention to the fact that in connection with their training in Germany and their sympathies the executed generals represented a Germanophile group in the Red Army leadership, elimination of whom logically should specifically benefit Franco-Soviet relations. Litvinov's reply could not persuade Coulondre. To the contrary, all ambassadors accredited to Moscow were firmly convinced that the charge of espionage did not conform to the truth.

"We firmly hold the opinion that the charges against the generals are only a pretext and that there never was an immediate or specific conspiracy. We continue to assume that Stalin removed the generals because they appeared suspicious to him because of their position, specifically along the line that they could become dangerous because of their influence on the Army's formation and as centers of the opposition's crystallization. It is fully possible that the actions against the generals are an affair or intrigue of the secret service of some state. Germany in itself had the right to continue to defend its previous position and not make serious denials to Soviet false charges inasmuch as we would not reach the objective which interests us from the political standpoint, specifically elimination of the Franco-Soviet treaty of alliance, by such denials..."

Yes, the Nazis worked subtly.

Historian Pfaff concludes:

"The bouquet of circumstantial evidence and reports increased to such an extent that it screened all false pictures and surrounded the thinking of Prague's political figures by the fiction of authenticity which would have stood up even in the face of any critical check. The contradiction that strikes the eye between the lengthy preparation, the seemingly promising course of talks of Germany emissaries with Benes and their unexpected cessation (cessation of the talks was announced in connection with the report of the upcoming coup in the Soviet Union and was substantiated by this), as it seems, permits considering the talks begun with Prague at Berlin's initiative to be a far-fetched chess move and a trap which pursued exclusively only two things: on the one hand to slip Benes 'proof' against Tukhachevskiy

and on the other hand to weaken the Soviet Army and artificially generate mistrust of Moscow on the part of the Prague and Paris governments."

And so the report of the Czechoslovak envoy and his wording about "Hitler's interest in catapulting us out of ties with Russia" did the job. It is tragic that Czechoslovak President Benes, who was attempting in his foreign policy to consistently implement provisions of the mutual assistance treaty concluded with the USSR, to a considerable extent assisted the affair of Tukhachevskiy's "plot" and the subsequent reprisal with him and other Soviet military leaders—Yakir, Uborevich, Putna, Eydeman, Kork, Feldman and Primakov.

On 7 May 1937 President Benes informed USSR Ambassador to Czechoslovakia Aleksandrovskiy in Prague about the "military plot" and on 8 May sent this material on in the form of a secret personal message to Stalin.

Irreparable Damage

On 11 May 1937 Marshal M. N. Tukhachevskiy was arrested on Stalin's order and on 11 June was shot by sentence of the court. This was the beginning of tyranny and repressions toward Red Army officer cadres. Marshal Tukhachevskiy's wife Nina Yevgenyevna and brothers Aleksandr and Nikolay subsequently were physically annihilated, also on Stalin's instruction. Three sisters were sent to camps. When a teenage daughter came of age she too was arrested. The mother and sister Sofya died in exile.

We consider it appropriate to extensively quote a number of documents in the final chapter which show and prove what irreparable damage Stalin's repressive policy inflicted on the Red Army and the country on the eve of war.

There was a report from the German Embassy in Paris on 17 June 1937 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin about reaction in France to the "Tukhachevskiy affair":

"In connection with the bloody sentence there is not a single newspaper, even the POPULAIRE (socialist) and in addition the openly Russophile OEUVRE, which would dare find a word of justification for the action itself. It is difficult to believe the substantiation of the sentence because of the enormity of the charge. Those newspapers which in their criticism at first presumed the charge to be correct are concluding from this that the Red Army's morale and combat effectiveness can be only lowered if such crimes are possible among the leadership. . . .

"An article by General Morain appeared in the JOURNAL about his conversation with Tukhachevskiy, whom he called 'a major Russian weapons specialist.' In this talk Tukhachevskiy allegedly declared: 'I am not asking you to talk about the equipment which you have; I know

it very well. I would be especially grateful to you if you would inform me about the equipment which presently is being created and if possible about equipment on the drawing boards.'"

Czechoslovak envoy Bogdan Pavlu informed Minister of Foreign Affairs Kamil Krofta from Moscow on 20 June 1937:

"It seems it was a question of peace and war which decided Tukhachevskiy's fate once and for all in case Tukhachevskiy was attempting, as could be assumed, to attract people on the High Military Council and in high military or government circles to his side, and perhaps even in the Komintern, as indicated by the vigorous purge being conducted there in parallel. It is asserted that Stalin had the very same mistrust regarding all members of the Communist International."

And here is a later document. On 9 November 1937 Division Gen Bohumil Fiala, deputy chief of the Czechoslovak General Staff, reported to Chief of Military Intelligence Service Col Frantisek Moravec under a "Top Secret" classification:

"Brother Colonel!

"Along the line of our yesterday's talk I am sending you, for free official use, a survey of impressions which our military delegation brought back from a trip to the USSR at the end of last month.

"While at first our Supreme Command refused to accept the elimination of Tukhachevskiy and the Soviet High Command element as a serious loss for the Red Army and was convinced after the beginning of the purge that 'the Russian Army was experiencing a dismal stage but still has great strength,' our delegation sent to check the status of Red Army training returned with troubling results exceeding the most gloomy expectations.

"The stream of mass repressions—insofar as we were able to determine at least 2,000 officers have been executed—generates fears regarding the Army's internal demoralization and the weakening of its operational striking power as well as readiness for action; regarding its inability to conduct offensive operations; and further due to new young commanders in the rank of lieutenant who have become regimental commanders by the thousands, and majors who have become division commanders with no tactical or strategic experience. We ascertain a terrible weakness in the sphere of command and control, strategy and tactics; we further ascertain obsolete gear and a shortage of the equipment and arms which our Army already has had for a long while."

The beginning of the Great Patriotic War and the damage which our Armed Forces suffered in its first stage showed the cost of the devastation of the Red Army high echelon by Stalin and his closest entourage on the eve of war.

The names of Marshal Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevskiy and his associates have been cleaned by history of the calumnies of lie and slander. They have taken their proper place in the rank of pioneer builders of our Army, their

contribution to national defense is great and indisputable, and their make-up as Communists and Leninists is pure and bright.

6904

Examination of Future Development of Italian Air Force

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2 Nov 88 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lt Col I. Kauzov under the rubric "In NATO's Headquarters and Armies": "Talons of the Eagle. Direction in Which the Italian VVS [Air Force] Is Developing"]

[Text] The strategic plans of the Pentagon and the NATO command are attaching an increasing importance to the South European theater of military operations and to Italy, which is in the center of this theater. In complete conformity with this situation, the power of the Italian armed forces is being increased by giving them a capability to move outside the bounds of national territory. Rapid deployment forces have been created for this purpose that are designed for operational redeployment over long distances; the "Giuseppe Garibaldi" aircraft carrier has been built; aircraft with long flight ranges are being purchased; Italian forces were sent to Lebanon and a warship was sent to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf; and Italian strategists are adhering to the dangerous NATO concept of "combat with the second echelon (reserves)."

The Italian military leadership is giving special attention to the air force. Constituting the basis of NATO's 5th Allied Tactical Air Command, it has in its inventory 12 combat air wings—about 280 aircraft: multipurpose F104G and F-104S fighters, G91Y ground attack aircraft, and "Tornado" fighter-bombers. The AMX fighter, which is supposed to replace the G91Y aircraft by 1995, began to enter the inventory starting in 1988. The Italian VVS requirement for a new fighter is estimated at 200 aircraft. Together with England, the FRG and Spain, Italy participates in a program for the development and creation of the fighter of the 1990's, the EFA.

Militaristic ambitions are being concealed by references to a "threat" that seemingly comes from the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization. The journal RIVISTA MILITARE, perhaps itself not desiring this, discloses the ill-intentioned aim of this slander when it comes out for this modernization of the armed forces, and first and foremost the VVS, as a result of which they would acquire a capability "to deliver a preemptive strike and to beat an aggressor to the punch." Expanding on this position, Italian General V. Kottona, who is the chief of the main staff of the VVS, declared that "it sometimes happens that it is much more useful to destroy the danger when it is still on the ground, and before an offensive starts."

Therefore, they are counting on the creation of an aircraft system that has great autonomy, relying for support on tanker aircraft and electronic surveillance aircraft. A 10-year VVS modernization program has been approved. Delivery is envisaged this year of four "Boeing-707's" for reequipping as tanker aircraft, which, as is noted in the press, will enable Italian aviation to carry out patrols over the entire Mediterranean basin.

Plans for the buildup of the VVS also envisage the activation of the ideological indoctrination of personnel, who number more than 70,000 persons: 8,000 officers, 35,000 noncommissioned officers and about 29,000 compulsory service soldiers and sergeants. Propaganda is being conducted among the servicemen first and foremost in the spirit of anti-Sovietism. A distorted picture of the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR is being suggested to them, and the myth about a "Soviet military threat" is being exaggerated. Peaceful Soviet initiatives, in particular concerning the Middle East and the Mediterranean Sea, are being distorted with the intention of presenting them as attempts by our country to establish its own "hegemony" in the Mediterranean Sea area. The RSMD [INF] treaty is interpreted as an act that is advantageous only, they say, to the USSR, and requires an increase by Italy and other NATO countries in conventional forces, especially the VVS. In an article "NATO After the Euro-Missile Treaty," Corps General V. Bernard states that the USSR, coming out as the initiator of detente and disarmament, is aspiring to "disarm Europe, and to break it away from the U.S. in order to dictate its own terms from a position of strength."

In doing this, they are trying in every way possible to propagandize the military cooperation of Italy with the U.S. and its active participation in the military organization of the NATO bloc, to justify the deployment on Italian soil of numerous U.S. Air Force and other bases, and to get the consent of the Italian government to provide shelter for 72 American F-16 aircraft which will have to leave the territory of Spain. Cooperation is being activated and ties are being strengthened between personnel of the Italian VVS and the 40th Tactical Air Group of the U.S. Air Force, which is based at Aviano airfield.

The Catholic church, whose influence in the Italian armed forces and in the country as a whole is great, holds a special place in ideological indoctrination. There is a priest-chaplain on each airbase who exercises "spiritual influence" over personnel. Not one step is taken without his presence, beginning with oath-taking and ending with the opening, for example, of a mess hall. The VVS command authorities use the influence of religion in their own interests, it strengthens its role and significance, lending an official character to all religious measures and drives. Thus, promotions, conferring ranks and so forth are timed to occur on the holiday in celebration of the Holy Mother from Loreto—the patroness of the VVS. Solemn church services, sermons and Sunday masses usually take place with a general forming-up of all personnel and with a trooping of the unit colors. A special prayer has been written for airmen, which by no means calls for Christian humility and charity: "God, give us the wings of an eagle, the sight of an eagle and the talons of an eagle. . ."

Careful selection in manning VVS units with officer and noncommissioned officer personnel, the presence of a significant number of volunteers (56 percent), and intensive ideological and psychological indoctrination have a noticeable influence on the moral and political condition

of personnel in a direction necessary to the command. Among officer personnel, dedication to the NATO bloc and alliance with the U.S. is strong. The more so because for Italian pilots a tour of duty with the U.S. Air Force is a mandatory stage in a military career. Without this tour of duty, an officer is not promoted. As is shown by data published by analytical press accounts, while 66.5 percent of the officers in the armed forces on the whole hold conservative and centrist views, the percentage is significantly higher in the VVS.

Long-term plans for increasing the combat strength of the Italian VVS and the education of personnel in the spirit of militaristic aspirations stand out in clear contradiction to the ideas of disarmament and detente which are capturing the people of Europe to an ever greater degree.

Military-Technical Review on Use of Naval Guns in Ground Forces

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[Article by B. Belyayev under "Military-Technical Review" rubric: "What the Testing of Naval Guns in Ground Forces and Vertical-Takeoff Aircraft Will Show"]

[Text] Instances of the use of naval guns in ground forces are rather rare. Only a few such attempts are known in the entire postwar history. It seems that it is now possible to talk about something new: in Italy, they are testing an experimental self-aiming antiaircraft gun OTOMATIK based on a 76-mm naval antiaircraft gun developed by the firm OTO Melara.

The main task of the new artillery system, note foreign military observers, is to combat attack helicopters, aircraft and cruise missiles. If necessary, it is possible to fire at ground targets—light tanks and armored personnel carriers.

The self-propelled gun OTOMATIK is composed of a revolving turret (weight 15 tons) set on a caterpillar chassis. The builders of the artillery system intend to put it on the chassis of the "Abrams" and "Leopard" tanks. For the time being, experimental models are on the chassis of the Italian self-propelled howitzer "Palmaria."

Judging by the advertising announcements, the turret has frontal armor capable of withstanding the impact of 20-mm shells fired from a range of 1,000 meters. Grenades are mounted on the sides to produce smoke screens. Also foreseen is a system to protect the crew against weapons of mass destruction.

The foreign press is providing the characteristics of the gun: nominal rate of fire of the 76-mm gun is 120 rounds per minute; the firing can be accomplished in a circular azimuth; the angle of elevation is from -5 degrees to 60 degrees. The maximum speed of moving the gun in the

vertical plane is 45 degrees/second and 70 degrees/second in the azimuth. The feeding of shells is automatic; the basic ready inventory is 29 shells.

It is indicated that there is an auxiliary supply of 30 shells (weight of each 12 kg; time to fire one round—10 seconds) for firing at ground targets. It is also noted that it is possible to utilize all types of shells designated for the original naval version of the gun.

But the OTOMATIC has a number of special features. Thus, it is possible to use the PFF shell with a proximity fuze and prepared fragments as well as an armor-piercing subcaliber finned shell. The latter is in the development stage and has an initial velocity of 1,617 meters/second with the capability of penetrating the frontal armor of an average tank at a range of 1,500 meters; it is possible to destroy an armored personnel carrier at a range of 2,200 meters.

The shell of type PFF has 3,750 fragmentary elements; on dispersion, the total number of fragments reaches 6,000. It is asserted that the reliable destruction of an aircraft is assured within a radius of 10 meters.

At the present time, the firm OKO Melara is developing a new 76-mm shell together with the English firm British Aerospace. It is conceived as a guided shell for use against maneuverable supersonic aircraft and cruise missiles. It is believed that it will also be possible to use it against helicopters hovering out of direct sight behind a shelter.

A radar complex and electronic display systems are included in the fire control system. Involved are a doppler search station VPS-A05 and a tracking station APG-A06. The search radar station is of the "quiet" type, which should reduce to a minimum the risk of destruction by antiradar systems and missiles.

The press notes that the aircraft detection range is 15 km and that of hovering helicopters is up to 8 km. The simultaneous tracking of 8 to 24 targets (depending on the computer memory capacity) is possible. At the same time, the tracking accuracy will be within 2 meters, the developers assert. As a passive detection system, use is made of a stabilized "Galileo" panoramic sight and an electrooptical sight with a laser range finder. In front of the gunner and gun commander is a control stand with two color displays. On one is shown alphanumeric information on the combat situation and the other is a remote target display.

Test firing of the OTOMATIC gun utilizing conventional sights was carried out at the end of 1987. In the summer of this year, they tested the radar complex. The tests will be continued but the new system is already evoking the interest of antiaircraft subunits that would like to use it together with the "Spad" antiaircraft missile complex to defend air bases.

The official ceremony dedicated to the completion of the development of the first experimental vertical-takeoff aircraft with rotary propellers, the Bell-Boeing Helicopter V-22 Osprey took place at the end of May at the Fort Worth plant of the American firm Bell. As the journal "Flight International" reported, it was planned to begin its flight tests in the fall.

The development of the "Osprey" aircraft has a long history. It began back in 1982 in accordance with the JVX Program providing for the development for the U.S. Armed Forces of a multipurpose vertical-takeoff aircraft for the performance of a rather wide range of tasks. The firms Bell and Boeing Helicopter were awarded a Defense Department contract for \$1.8 billion, under which they were to build six experimental prototypes of the V-22 and carry out a flight test program. The "Osprey" aircraft is supposed to become operational at the end of 1991. Other periods—the beginning of 1992—are also named.

And although the tests have not yet been completed, as the foreign press reports, there are plans to procure 682 such aircraft: 552 for the Marine Corps, 80 for the air force and 50 for the navy. The U.S. Army has its own plans. It intends to procure 281 aircraft. But this matter has not yet been resolved definitively. In any case, the total cost of the V-22 "Osprey" aircraft program will be \$35 billion.

Advertising is sparing no efforts to praise the "Osprey." It is reported in a number of publications that the aircraft will be usable for the military transport of loads of up to 4 tons; as an airborne landing aircraft capable of taking 24 members of the landing force with their

equipment; as a search and rescue, reconnaissance and combat aircraft for engaging enemy subsonic aircraft and helicopters; for carrying out antisubmarine defense operations and tracking operations.

It is anticipated that aircraft built for the navy will be based on aircraft carriers, and therefore it is foreseen that there will be a system for folding the blades of the rotary propellers and swinging the wing back against the fuselage.

In characterizing the special nature of the vertical-takeoff aircraft, foreign experts are paying attention to the extensive use of composite materials: their share in the airframe exceeds 70 percent. The "Osprey" has high wings with two three-blade rotary propellers 11.58 meters in diameter on the ends. The dimensions of the cargo cabin are considered average: length 7.32 meters, width 1.83 meters and height 1.83 meters. The power plant of the aircraft is composed of two turboprop Allison T406 engines with a thrust of 6,150 horsepower. The engines are located on pivoting nacelles on the wing tips.

The maximum takeoff weight in vertical takeoff is 21,320 kg, 27,440 kg with a short takeoff run. The fuel reserve is 6,200 kg and it can be increased in the case of a ferrying flight; the cruising speed is 510 km/hour. It is asserted that the aircraft can fly sideways and backwards at a speed of 60 km/hour. The combat radius is between 370 and 950 km depending upon the nature of the mission. Other "pluses" are also named but with the reservation that the last word will be said after the conclusion of tests.

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Vietnam, Afghan Veterans Meet, Discuss Common Problems

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[Article by Galina Sidorova, with contributions by Veronica Khilchevskaya: "The War Syndrome"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] At the beginning was the letter:

I am enclosing my thoughts on a joint Soviet-American effort to help returning Soviet veterans of the Afghanistan war readjust to society and perhaps avoid some of the serious problems that plague the American Vietnam veterans.

Please keep in mind, however, that my intent is not to criticize nor condone the actions or inactions of either the Soviet or U.S. governments. My sole purpose is to honour the warrior not the war.

As you know, the war in Vietnam was a very unpopular one with the American people. As a result, the American people frequently showed their distaste for the war by either virtually ignoring the returning veterans or by blaming them for the war itself.

When we came "home" it was sometimes into a very hostile environment. Even our loved ones, family and friends did not know how to respond to us. For the returning warrior this could lead to loneliness, isolation, distrust, anger and pain. Most of the time there was no one to talk out our problems with, to understand us, to turn to, except other veterans of that war.

Frustration, at times, ruled our lives. Because of that and our experiences in war, we withdrew instead. For many of us this meant turning to alcohol, drugs, and/or crime. For others, many others, it meant suicide.

Because a few concerned and dedicated medical professionals recognized a need to study and help the Vietnam veteran, a new phrase was added to the Vietnam war dictionary: post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This malady has stricken approximately one of every three Vietnam veterans and continues to be a vital source of research material for the medical profession.

As a combat veteran and concerned citizen of this planet, I can see and feel a great similarity between my Soviet brothers and us. We share a common bond: our country called us to duty and we answered the call. We went to do a job to the best of our abilities.

I know my Soviet brothers will agree when I say that military orders are not to be questioned, only obeyed. We did obey, therefore we became warriors for our respective homelands. For this we are to be respected by those who did not go and fight.

In my opinion, combat is a desperate act of survival. It also changes a man.

Wars make the men who fight them comrades. Sometimes it is hard to realize how lucky we veterans are to have survived a war; other times we may feel guilty because we did.

All of this leads me to believe that we—my Soviet brothers, my American Vietnam veteran brothers and me—share many of the same problems. Problems that Vietnam veterans have been trying to solve for many years. Together we can help each other to cope and to heal.

After all, to view the horrors of war and survive must motivate one to help promote peace."

Respectfully, **Danny Reed**, Vietnam war veteran, Iowa

This letter was handed over to me in Iowa City last summer by the Iowa Senator Jean Lloyd-Jones. Unfortunately, its author could not turn up in person. "He is very hopeful that his suggestion will get someone interested," Jean told me. Neither she, nor myself believed then that this idea would ever become a reality in the near future.

"With us, it's different," a Moscow official intoned. And threw in a cliché: "Our internationalist warriors have gone through a grim school of life, learnt a great deal and grown up. Now they are an example for our youth to follow."

The letter didn't get him interested.

The idea voiced by the American veteran has taken root. On the Soviet side, it has been implemented by the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's Social Inventions Fund, and on the American side, by Reed's compatriots, also veterans, through the Earthstewards Network organization. The American veterans have visited the U.S.S.R. on a mission of mercy. Their delegation comprised psychologists, experts in postwar traumas, prosthetic devices and equipment for the disabled. Also on the delegation were representatives of ATW, a company that organized the production of wheelchairs in many countries. The Americans brought along prostheses of their make and the equipment for their manufacture. They held talks on exchanges with a number of Soviet cooperatives, and among them the recently formed cooperative Invatekhnik in Moscow.

All the participants in the meeting said that the most important thing for them was to communicate with people who have an experience of war and therefore have a lot in common.

Our correspondent Veronica Khilchevskaya has talked with the Soviet and American participants in the Moscow meeting:

Nikolai Chuvanov, 28

"I did my service in Afghanistan in 1979-80. I was wounded in July 1980 and admitted to hospital. I was

wounded in the leg. It all ended with gas gangrene and an amputation."

"Was it difficult for you to return to normal life?"

"It is very difficult to recall all this. I did not realize at the hospital that I was now a disabled man. All are equal there, all were badly wounded. When I returned to Moscow, I met my friends. All of them were healthy and their lives were full of interesting things. I realized then that a lot will be missing from my own life, and I must confess that I gave in. I started boozing and using drugs whenever I had a chance to get them."

"Where did you use drugs for the first time?"

"In Afghanistan. Then in the hospital. The anaesthetic injections they gave me were narcotic. After the doctors realized that I could no longer do without them, they tried to help me. I left the hospital practically withdrawn from addiction. But in Moscow I found myself under stress and started using drugs again. I had a good run of luck: I have a friend with whom we went through a great deal at the hospital. It was he who got me on my feet again."

"We had an honest-to-good talk with him. He told me that if I didn't want to end up alone, I had to quit. It is either friendship or booze and drugs, he said. I knew he would never leave me in the lurch. But I was afraid to be alone, among people who value only themselves. Few knew then what the Afghan war is like. Some pictured us as holiday-makers basking in the sun, going on hikes to the mountains and making a lot of money...I came back without a penny to my name."

"I got a job in the end. My former YCL secretary managed to get me involved in YCL activities. He wasn't too hard on me. He tried to get me interested in this life. In general, he prevented me from hitting the rock bottom."

"Have you got a family?"

"I used to have one, but I got a divorce. I might get married soon."

"You work in the Invatekhnik cooperative now. How have you got there?"

"I got a phone call from them. They learned that I was disabled and that I was concerned with the problems of the army invalids in reserve. They said I could help the cooperative and the boys because the prostheses they make enable them to walk. I tested the products of the cooperative myself. Before that I tried to walk without a stick for eight years. That was real hard. My old prosthesis chafed, and it took a long time getting used to it. I can do without the stick now and am doing a lot more walking."

"What was your first reaction to the American Vietnam war veterans wishing to come to the U.S.S.R. and meet with Afghan veterans?"

"I wanted to meet with them for a long time. Before Afghanistan, I thought badly of them. Regarded them as murderers and barbarians. After I went through the war myself, I realized that many of them are plain fightingmen who did as they were told."

"Did you get along well?"

"Here is an example. There is a guy named Shad Meshad on the U.S. delegation. We've made friends. One day we got together at the place of one of our Afghan veterans. He listened to me without knowing a word of Russian. I had no English at all. I told him of my experience in Afghanistan by gestures and mimics. When the interpreter came up, I asked Shad what he understood of my story. He retold everything almost word for word."

"Our good old fainthearted bureaucrats still put up a lot of barriers. But the stereotypes are beginning to crumble. Hopefully, we shall have a chance to meet with the Americans more and to go visiting. The Americans told me that when their group was in its formative stage, they got a lot of letters from veterans many of whom were eager to come over and meet us."

"They have come over to help. How can they help?"

"With advice. They have gone through what we are experiencing now. They have a record of removing stresses. In our case, readaptation and readjustment are big problems, which include the POW issue. They can invite our boys over for prosthetic help."

"We had long and frank conversations. One of them, Larry, said he nearly committed suicide in 1982. That was a terrible story, very much like those I heard from those I knew. An acquaintance of mine went insane and was even admitted to a mental asylum. It seemed they helped him, but he hanged himself in the end. He was haunted by scenes of violence. What we have gone through leaves scars. That is our cross which we are going to bear throughout our lives. That is our sin."

Professor Charles Figley, Purdue University, editor of the JOURNAL OF TRAUMATIC STRESS, a Vietnam war veteran

"We can help Soviet Afghan veterans as people to people. On the bus tonight, an Afghan vet had an anxiety reaction as we call it. He had difficulty breathing and people thought he had a heart attack. I sat down with him in the dark, getting him to breathe regularly in terms of stress control, something I have done many times. It's something we hope we can share with our colleagues here so they can do it themselves."

"What was your first reaction when you learned that the Vietnam vets are coming to Moscow?"

"I thought it was a good idea. I had heard I was invited and I asked immediately who was coming and I felt that the delegation was appropriate. These people are sensitive to cultural differences between our countries and aware of the difficulties we are likely to face, so I felt that it was a good idea."

"What did you think of Soviet Afghan veterans before you came here?"

"My impression was that they probably were a lot like us. People don't make war, governments make war. I had had impressions of the Soviet government and the society which were different before I came. I explain this by changes your society is now going through."

"Was it hard for you to discuss with Soviet veterans their problems?"

"They were not open to us in the beginning. We were strangers to them. They were distrusting and suspicious. They later told us that they perceived Vietnam veterans as murderers. So there were moments in which we were uncertain about how it would go. But as we shared our perspectives we could see that we had much more in common than we had differences."

"What about the language barrier?"

"Because you've seen war, you have brotherhood and you understand one another, and that helps, but the languages and the cultures are vastly different, and it takes time to appreciate and understand these differences. Once these barriers began to fall and we understood more, the emotions took over. As a matter of fact, many of my Afghan friends believe that I can speak Russian, because I look in their eyes and when they are sad I look sad. I can sense what they feel and they know that."

"You have much more of an opportunity here in your country to help 'Afghans' than we have, and it's just a matter of giving information to those people who can use it and want to help."

**Ruslan Khuriev, chairman of the cooperative
Invatekhnik**

"The main purpose of our cooperative is to assist the social and labour rehabilitation of the disabled and provide them with wheelchairs and, if possible, with jobs. At first nobody was prepared to be our guarantor, but the Sverdlov district Party committee and the district YCL committee helped us a great deal."

"Do you employ disabled people?"

"Yes we do, half of our staff are disabled."

"Do you help those who were disabled in Afghanistan? How many people have you helped so far?"

"We made prostheses for 26 soldiers disabled in Afghanistan. Our total output to date is 50 prostheses, but we could have made a lot more. The trouble is that we do not have enough shopfloor. What we have at the moment has taken a great deal of effort to obtain and it is certainly not enough."

"Where does your funding come from? Who supports your cooperative?"

"It all began with a grant from the Soviet Red Cross Society. We got 50,000 rubles and spent the money on equipment we needed to manufacture prostheses. The manufacture of prostheses at the moment operates at a loss, because skilled labour requires high pay."

"How do your products compare with those made at factories run by the state?"

"As far as their design is concerned, the differences are very slight. The most important feature of our products is that they are tailor-made. We want to have satisfied customers, and that is the reason why people are seeking our services."

"Do you have subsidiaries in other cities?"

"We would very much like to open subsidiaries in Makhachkala, Kharkov, Tula and Gorky. At the moment we are helping the boys at the hospital in Krasnogorsk where they came from all over the country. As far as pay is concerned, that responsibility was assumed by the Fund for Social Inventions of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA."

"Was the meeting with the American veterans useful for you?"

"There were specialists in prostheses among the American group. We invited them to come over and had a very useful discussion. They are very outgoing and nice people. They promised to help us, to give us tool and technological consultations. We also met with representatives of ATW to discuss joint production of comfortable and light wheelchairs. We made many joint plans. The financial part of the deal will be taken care of by the Fund for Social Inventions and the Red Cross."

"Has the Soviet Defence Ministry helped you? Perhaps it pays part of the production costs?"

"We have not yet visited the ministry, but we have thought of offering it our services. We could extend a subscriber service to Moscow residents who were disabled in Afghanistan, that is, we shall be looking after

every one of them for, say 5 years. That will make their lives much easier, I am sure. We are also hoping for some help from the Health Ministry who could at least provide us with some equipment."

Robert Putzi, prosthetist

"We are trying to make a deal with the Invatekhnika cooperative. If we come to a mutual agreement, we shall be able to help them with our technology. The Soviet prosthetic care is about twenty years behind ours. We'd like to cooperate their technology and ours. We'd like to have an exchange programme so that Soviet technicians could come to the United States and we could come here again and to exchange ideas."

Diana Glasgow, Earthstewards Network organization, head of the delegation

"For the last four years I've been arranging for special groups of American young people and teenagers to come to the Soviet Union. Actually, my interest in the present mission grew out of my experience with those young people. Children will grow up, I thought, and may be called up to fight in a war.

"I was aware that Vietnam veterans had very many problems after their return from the war. The American people were not prepared to understand them. That was a tragic consequence of the Vietnam war. While 58,000 Americans were killed in action, at least that many committed suicide back home. Many had drug or alcohol problems. They returned to a country that turned a blind eye to their plight. So they began to form groups, helping each other psychologically.

"Early this year I asked some Afghan veteran friends of mine whether they would be interested to meet Vietnam veterans. They got very excited about it. Back home, I found that our veterans were equally excited at the prospect. They felt they had a great deal to say to each other. In our country, the leading specialists in prosthetic devices, wheelchairs and in psychological readjustment of Vietnam war veterans are Vietnam war veterans too.

"I think that the rapport between the Russian and American veterans was instantaneous. They have seen some aspects of life of which other people in their countries are completely unaware. When they talked with each other they found there were many differences in the wars, but their feelings upon returning home were the same."

Alexander Povsten, 27

"I was called up in 1979. Very soon our regiment was put on combat alert and sent to Afghanistan. On December 6, 1981, I was wounded and on December 8, I was admitted to hospital in Tashkent."

"What sort of wound did you get?"

"I was hit by a shell fragment. I was discharged from hospital in January 1982, but readmitted on many occasions later."

"How did you get along after the hospital?"

"At first all was well. I married and moved to Moscow. I worked full-time until 1986, but then my legs began to fail. I was hospitalized again and given a disability pension. After that I saw no end of trouble. They could not offer me any decent job. They would pay me peanuts for what it took a whole day to do. For nearly a year we had to subsist on 140 rubles a month, the wife, two kids and myself. A couple of months ago Nikolai called me and offered the job at the cooperative. It is only now that I began to feel that I am a man again and that I can be useful.

"The most striking thing for me after I returned was that the people here have no idea at all of what is going on there and just go about their business as if nothing is happening. You journalists began writing about this only a year ago, and even so you don't tell the whole truth, far from it. But then I got used to it. I got sick and tired of telling people about my experience."

"What was your attitude towards meeting the Americans?"

"I was sort of scared at first. I did not know what to say or how to behave, but in about a half-hour I understood that their problems are very much like ours."

"Don't you want to learn some English to be able to communicate with them better?"

"We managed to understand each other perfectly, but generally I would have learnt English with great pleasure. The trouble is that because of that shell shock my memory is not in the best shape."

Kolya Chuvanov, Sasha Povsten and thousands of others...

What is the attitude of society to those whose fate it directed eight years ago and who paid with their lives or health for a decision that in my view should never have been taken?

A young lad who has just returned home from war said:
"You don't grow older fighting in a war, you grow old."

To this day we still feel ill at ease about referring to our soldiers who fought in Afghanistan as veterans, although many of them aged many years over the few years or months they spent there.

We are talking of humanitarian values, the value of every human life, but at times we forget about these notions when we have to deal with one particular individual.

We are also talking of the humanization of politics, but very often this is a contradiction in terms in real life. How can we deal with that contradiction? That is no easy task.

The issue of POWs is one of such incredibly difficult problems.

The Soviet Union has said that it will be prepared to negotiate with any Afghan opposition group. One of the leaders of the so-called Peshawar Seven, Gailani, for his part, told our special correspondent that they "are prepared to hand over all the POWs to the U.S.S.R., but only through direct negotiations." The political objective is quite clear: the mujahedeen look upon the POWs as a pretext for entering into direct talks with the Soviet Union and thereby gaining recognition. The Soviet Union does not recognize them and it would rather have other partners at the talks. Those are political imperatives, but what about the human imperatives? The lives of our fellow countrymen are still at stake.

Humanitarian values, sympathy and mercy are making their way into our lives far too slowly.

The meeting of the Soviet and American veterans of recent wars reaffirmed the priority of humanitarian values over all others. Whatever the differences between the objectives pursued by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the United States in Vietnam may have been, both countries have drawn universal lessons from those two wars.

These lessons make us think hard of the inadmissibility of waging war on foreign territory for whatever reason. They remind us again that war spares no one as it cripples human beings morally and physically and very often gives them no change of readapting to normal life.

The Vietnam syndrome is a coinage to which we, as well as Americans, have grown accustomed in recent years. Few are prepared to accept the term the "Afghanistan syndrome," though. I believe that we should speak of the war syndrome, a term I would use to describe the mental and physical state of many of those who have returned home from Afghanistan. They need care and understanding on the part of society at large more than anybody else. They need our care and understanding.

I open another letter. It came from Valentina Kondratyeva (the Kalinin region).

"My son has not written for two months. He was sent to Afghanistan in October 1987. Could you please help me in my inquiries..."

Not long ago came one more letter from Valentina Kondratyeva:

"At last I've got a letter from my son. Thank God they have been pulled out."

Afghan Veteran's Psychological Problems Detailed

*18010141 Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
2 Sep 88 p 4*

[Article by Valeriy Budumyan under rubric "Emergency Situation": "Who Will Help the Soldier-Internationalist?"; first two paragraphs are ZARYA VOSTOKA introduction]

[Text] "Because of my grief and impotence I do not know where to turn or from whom to request assistance. I no longer have any strength, and no faith in justice remains. It is painful, very painful to me for my son Sasha!"

That is the beginning of the letter sent to the editors by Sofya Nikolayevna Semenkova, the mother of former soldier-internationalist Aleksandr Semenov.

I telephoned her and requested a meeting. Then Sofya Nikolayevna was sitting before me.

"You would like to speak with Sasha?" she asked. "I do not advise it. It is very difficult to converse with him. He doesn't wish to see anyone since he returned from Afghanistan. He has become reserved and has completely retired within himself."

Just what happened?

After completing one of the Tbilisi construction PTU [vocational-technical schools], Aleksandr like many of his contemporaries was called into the Army in 1980. Initially he was sent to a training subunit in Ashkhabad and then to Afghanistan.

The first year of service went relatively quietly. Nice, warm letters came from Sasha. His family also received many letters of thanks from the unit command element. Aleksandr Semenov was decorated with the Valor medal for combat merit.

It was 1982, the year of discharge, the year of Sgt Semenov's return home to his native Tbilisi.

Then came the ill-fated battle near Kandahar.

An airborne force was dropped near the location of a rebel band. The force also included Semenov's subunit. It was necessary to dislodge the dushman from fortified positions. It was not a simple mission. The mountainous terrain also complicated its execution.

The platoon in which Sasha served repeatedly assaulted the "ghosts" positions. In one such assault, when only six persons remained alive in the platoon, an enemy rocket launcher projectile burst literally under the sergeant's feet.

Aleksandr came to only in the Kandahar Hospital. The wound was serious. Physicians were even thinking of amputating both legs. Aleksandr endured four very complicated operations. They sutured him and again operated, drew together torn tendons, removed fragments and sewed him up again. It seemed there would be no end to this nightmare. They saved his legs, but the lad's nervous system was entirely upset. We will add to this that he still returned to his own unit after the hospital. Whether or not this was the correct decision is not the question now.

Semenkov was discharged several months later. They awaited him impatiently at home.

"But from the very first day something incomprehensible began," says Sofya Nikolayevna. "He shut himself up in his room, didn't speak with anyone, and even refused to eat with us. That is how it went the entire year. The fact is, however, that before Afghanistan he was a gentle, loving son.

"Later he began to drink, make an uproar at home and pounce on the household. He would work occasionally. He would find a job in one place, then quit, and so it went.

"At night he has nightmares, leaps up, shouts, and calls his dead friends to follow him into an assault...

"I repeatedly turned to the physicians for help. I even called in psychiatrists. One of them told me that Sasha had a traumatic psychosis and had to be examined. They sent him to a psychiatric hospital, where he lay for several days, but the physicians concluded that he was not their patient.

"The situation kept getting more and more aggravated. Sasha continued to drink with even greater zeal.

"I was forced to turn to the divisional police inspector for help. He responded to my request and helped get my son into a narcological hospital. Sasha spent over a month there, but with no improvements."

What is the matter? Perhaps the patient's case was that very one where modern medicine is powerless to help him? It is difficult to say, but it is also possible to understand the medical personnel's situation. Unquestionably a new approach is needed to such patients as Semenov, and possibly even a new system of treatment. In any case, he will not be cured by the usual methods. This is also indicated by the fact that Aleksandr subsequently spent time also in the Tbilisi District Military Hospital, but also without result.

Here it must be said that these and other physicians were forced to treat Semenov without knowing his case record, but the fact is that in this instance it is of paramount importance.

Hospital associates and the Gldanskiy Military Commissariat of the city of Tbilisi sent off queries to Kandahar and to the Tashkent Hospital where he also lay after being wounded, but they still have not received the case record. The fact is that several years already have gone by. The former soldier-internationalist more and more is becoming an inveterate drunkard. The young man is deteriorating before people's eyes.

Of course, if this case is considered from a formal standpoint, one can say that a certain amount of work has been done by the divisional police inspector, by the hospital and by the military commissariat, but perhaps this is specifically that situation where all of us should display a maximum of attention, sensitiveness and humanity and support Aleksandr morally. The fact is that the fate of the former soldier-internationalist, to whom society owes a debt, hinges on this. We cannot miss the slightest opportunity to pull him out of the quagmire into which he is sinking deeper and deeper. Who is capable of this? Who must take a step toward a person who has gotten into trouble? It is of course all those who were next to Aleksandr before the Army and during service. Above all these are his friends, classmates and brothers in arms. Where are they now? Why did they forget about those times when they were growing up with Sasha in the same yard, sitting with him at the same desk in school and in the vocational-technical school, and fighting the dushman? Why are former "Afghans" from the council of soldier-internationalists established in Gldanskiy Rayon of the city of Tbilisi inactive? The fact is that their word today can and must be the deciding one.